Alligators, Burritos and Bears – Oh My!

Having litigated several “assault” cases, nothing ceases to amaze this author more than the vast number of unfortunate ways people find themselves in the most bizarre and unforeseeable situations. Courts across the United States adjudicating assault-based cases in the workers’ compensation context are faced with determining whether the events leading to the assault arose out of an injured workers’ employment or whether the event was purely personal in nature. Here are some of the more inexplicable events that could give rise to a claim — you decide whether these claims would be compensable.


In 2007, an individual was feeding a bear at the Great Bear Adventure in northern Montana. It was undisputed that the individual had smoked pot prior to entering the bear cage with food. The manager of the park had told the individual not to feed the bear as the food was being tapered due to hibernation. When the individual entered the enclosure, he was mauled by the bear.  Although the employer argued that the individual was outside the scope of the employment, the Montana appellate court found that the bear was “an equal opportunity mauler” who attacked regardless of the marijuana use. As noted by the decision, the use of drugs (which the court admonished at best) had no bearing on the actual animal attack.


More traumatically, in August 2018, police were called to a construction scene in Wisconsin. The police discovered that a co-worker allegedly attacked and killed another co-worker with a circular saw. The co-worker was arrested at the scene. A subsequent investigation documented that the co-worker assailant had told other crew members during the day of the attack that other crew members were teasing him about a one-night stand he had had the evening before.  The legal question, other than the criminal liability of the assailant, is whether the decedent’s estate/dependents would be entitled to workers’ compensation death benefits? Was the attack work related, or did it arise out of a direct personal dispute between the assailant and decedent? Based upon the facts of this case, you be the judge.


Although the case above could be on the border of compensability depending on the facts, a more clear-cut assault occurred in January 2018 in South Carolina. During that event, the manager of a fast food restaurant got into a heated verbal altercation with an employee over shift scheduling. When the manager told the employee to “stop being a crybaby,” the employee wrapped up the argument by throwing a hot, “loaded burrito” at the manager. According to the manager, melted cheese stuck onto the manager’s left side and leg. Apparently, the manager recovered from the hot cheese injuries, but could a mental impairment injury also be included in this type of event?


Finally, imagine yourself working as a fast food drive through employee. It’s a typical day of serving food and drinks, handing the items to customers through an open window. Now imagine serving a soft-drink, and, while the window is open, the customer throws a three-and-a-half-foot alligator through the window at you. In 2016, that is exactly what happened to a fast food employee in Florida. The customer was later apprehended and claimed that he threw the alligator into the restaurant as a funny prank. While it is unclear whether the employee sustained any physical injuries, the assault by semi-aquatic reptile exemplifies what a neutral force assault is in terms of workers’ compensation liability for injuries arising out of employment.


The above cases raise unique issues concerning assaults, whether by an animal, a co-employee, or a random person who just happened to pick up an alligator from the side of the road prior to getting lunch, that can be tricky and fact dependent.  When you need help untangling the facts and details surrounding a claim, please contact one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown.

“Wind” Will This Ever End?

As we recently celebrated the 4th of July with family and friends, we must not lose sight of the Founding Fathers and formation of the Constitution. Interestingly, John Hancock was the only one to sign on July 4, 1776, while the others signed at a later date. We are fortunate that the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution to incorporate a judicial system that allows people the opportunity to be heard as that luxury does not exist in many other places in the world. Often, the higher courts will have to decide issues from the lower courts to interpret a statute, applicability of the law, admissibility of evidence, etc. The workers’ compensation laws are subject to the same scrutiny as any other law or statute.


The Workers’ Compensation Act and system was created to provide a quick and efficient resolution to injured workers and the ability through the administrative courts to avoid the long delays that could ensue in the trial courts. Ironically, workers’ compensation claims can be tied up in litigation much longer than the trial courts which was not the intent of the legislature. While the hope and intent are clear, due to the many nuances and different interpretation of the workers’ compensation laws, there will continue to be disputes that arise.


While different in each state, workers’ compensation medical benefits are subject to a fee schedule set by the legislature. By statute, a medical provider could not collect payment for medical expenses beyond those paid by the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurer. The intent (hopefully) is to have a level playing field and no disputes over what fee is to be charged to avoid any delay to the injured worker for medical care.


Plain and simple, the cost for a medical benefit under a workers’ compensation claim is subject to a set fee by the legislature regardless of what the provider may charge outside of the system for the same service. This also, for policy reasons, provides some relief to the carriers given the volume of workers’ compensation claims. They will not be burdened with extreme medical costs providing medical benefits to claimants as medical providers are limited to the amounts under the fee schedule.


With that said, in May of this year the Colorado Court of Appeals rendered an opinion that focused on the admissibility of past medical expenses when the claimant/plaintiff is injured on the job and sues the third-party tortfeasor. The Court considered whether “billed” medical expenses versus what was actually “paid” were to be considered by the court and jury in awarding damages to a claimant/plaintiff. Before trial, the defendant had extinguished the insurer’s subrogation interest in the amounts paid by paying off the insurer’s claim for those damages.


The case was brought before the Court based on claimant/plaintiff’s appeal that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the amounts “billed” by his medical providers and only admitted the amounts “paid” by the carrier for his medical care and treatment. The Court was to determine whether billed versus paid medical benefits were permitted in a third-party lawsuit.

The Court held:

  • The collateral source rule barred admissibility of the medical expenses paid by the workers’ compensation carrier.
  • The plaintiff could present evidence at trial of the higher i.e. “billed” medical expenses by the providers.


Briefly, claimant worked for United Airlines (“United”) and was struck by an employee of Delta Airlines (“Delta”) at Denver International Airport – both were driving similar luggage tug vehicles. Claimant’s injuries were in the course and scope of employment, therefore, admitted and his indemnity and medical benefits were paid by his employer pursuant to statute.


Claimant’s employer sought reimbursement and sued Delta and its at-fault driver. Claimant sued the same defendants to recover for his personal injuries related to his work injury. United’s claim against Delta was settled for $328,799.16 and the case was dismissed with prejudice leaving only claimant and Delta as parties. Delta admitted liability but disputed claimant’s claimed damages so the case went to trial. At the first trial, claimant was awarded $1.5 million but a new trial was granted due to misconduct by claimant’s attorney.


At the second trial (which interestingly was a bench trial), plaintiff was not allowed to provide evidence of the higher “billed” amounts from the providers for medical expenses but only the amounts actually “paid” by the employer. The plaintiff was awarded $259,176 in damages of which $194,426 was for economic damages. The court subsequently entered an order to set-off claimant’s economic damages by the amount defendant had paid to settle the workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff argued this was not fair since his award for economic damages was reduced to zero.


The injured worker appealed. In its decision, the Court ruled that the collateral source rule applied to workers’ compensation benefits. The collateral source rule, or collateral source doctrine, is an American case law evidentiary rule that prohibits the admission of evidence that the plaintiff or victim has received compensation from some source other than the damages sought against the defendant. In Colorado, the first component requires a trial court to set off tort verdicts by the amount of certain collateral source payments received by the plaintiff unless the payments were made because of a contract entered into and paid for on the plaintiff’s behalf. § 13-21-111.6, C.R.S. 2018. The second component bars evidence of a plaintiff’s receipt or entitlement to benefits received from a collateral source, most often an insurance company, “because such evidence could lead the fact-finder to improperly reduce the plaintiff’s damages award on the grounds that the plaintiff already recovered his loss from the collateral source. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 276 P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012).


The Court noted that “even though claimant did not personally pay premiums toward his workers’ compensation insurance, he gave consideration for the same in the form of his employment services.” Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 1992). The same holds true to the defendant, who did not contribute in any way to the premiums paid to him and, therefore, the benefits paid were wholly collateral to the defendant. Therefore, the collateral source rule applies, and the defendant may be responsible for plaintiff’s damages regardless of what was paid by the workers’ compensation carrier. “The Court rationalized this will prevent a wrongdoer from reaping the benefits of a contract to which he is not a party.” The National Law Review, Colorado Court of Appeals Permits Evidence of Billed Workers’ Compensation Benefits at Trial.


In further reasoning of its decision, the Court acknowledged the workers’ compensation statute provides that amounts billed in excess of the statutory fee schedule are “unlawful, void, and unforceable.” This statutory language effectively prevents the plaintiff, as a matter of law, from having any legal obligation to pay such billed amounts. The Court cited a decision from the Colorado Supreme Court that stated, “the fact a bill is uncollectable does not render it entirely irrelevant to the reasonable value of the medical services provided.” Volunteers of America v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 (Colo. 2010).


There was a dissenting opinion issued by the Court which identifies the effect this ruling will have for claims in the future. “To allow injured workers to pursue expenses against the defendant in excess of what workers’ compensation already paid for his/her injuries contravenes the intent and purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In part, this now affords the injured worker a windfall which the Act was not designed to do.” The dissenting opinion also makes note that the court is in the position of enforcing unenforceable contracts since the billed amounts are void and unenforceable based on the fee schedule specific to workers’ compensation claims.


The opinion of the Court has certainly created a stir as it now essentially creates a windfall in favor of the injured worker and settlement with workers’ compensation carriers before trial essentially meaningless.


We will wait to see if the Court’s decision is brought before the Colorado Supreme Court for further review and determination of this now complicated, and to be highly debated, topic.


Colorado is addressing the ongoing opioid epidemic with an array of public and private initiatives.  Per the American Medical Association,  the state Medicaid agency (the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing [HCPF]) and the Division of Insurance (DOI) are spearheading the initiatives.  On March 16, 2018, the revised Guidelines for Prescribing and Dispensing Opioids were adopted by all six of Colorado’s prescribing and dispensing Boards: the Colorado Dental Board, the Colorado Medical Board, the State Board of Nursing, the State Board of Optometry, the Colorado Podiatry Board and the State Board of Pharmacy.  On May 21, 2018, then Governor, John Hickenlooper, signed Senate Bill 18-22, Clinical Practice for Opioid Prescribing.  The bill, which limits the number of opioid pills a healthcare provider can prescribe, went into effect immediately upon the Governor’s signature.  Under the new law, a prescriber must limit a patient’s initial prescription of an opioid to a seven-day supply, if the prescriber has not written an opioid prescription for the patient in the preceding twelve months.   All six dispensing Boards recommend a prescription of less than 50 MME per day and utilization of long-acting or extended relief formulations. These limits do not apply in certain discrete situations, including, if, in the judgment of the prescriber, the patient:


  • Has chronic pain that typically lasts longer than 90 days past the point of healing, as determined by the prescriber;
  • Has been diagnosed with cancer and is experiencing cancer-related pain;
  • Is experiencing post-surgical pain, expected to last longer than fourteen days due to the nature of the procedure; or
  • Is undergoing palliative care or hospice care designed to improve quality of life.


After the first prescription, the prescriber may exercise discretion in issuing a second-fill for a seven-day supply. In cases of a second-fill, the prescriber is required to check the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) database before prescribing additional opioids for the same  patient.  Failure to check the PDMP constitutes unprofessional conduct if the prescriber repeatedly fails to comply with this PDMP requirement.  The requirement to check the PDMP on a second-fill does not apply in situations exempting compliance with the seven-day first-fill, with two additional exemptions:


  • The patient is receiving the opioid in a hospital, skilled nursing, residential, or correctional facility; or
  • Is receiving treatment during a natural disaster or where mass casualties have taken place.


After the second opioid prescription, the law has no additional restrictions on the healthcare provider’s prescribing practices.


In keeping with SB 18-22, the Colorado Division of Workers’ Compensation recently released its amendments to Rule 18, W.C.R.P., the Medical Fee Schedule. The updated fee schedule took effect January 1, 2019.  While several important changes were made in the amended fee schedule rule for 2019, including inclusion of the most current CPT code terminology, HCPCS codes, Colorado Z-codes (state-specific billing codes) and Medicare’s most current National Physician Fee Schedule Relative Value file, with updated conversion factors, the amended rule also incorporates the revised physician prescription/dispensing restrictions on opioids.   The amended rule language provides:


Opioids classified as Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substances that are prescribed for treatment lasting longer than seven days shall be provided by a pharmacy.


The changes to Rule 18, W.C.R.P. suggest the Division of Workers’ Compensation intends to move forward and integrate any necessary modifications to drive full compliance with the new restrictions on physician dispensing of Schedule II and III opioids. Physicians prescribing chronic opioids through the Workers’ Compensation system are also expected to comply with Colorado’s Medical Treatment Guidelines, Rule 17, Exhibit 9, addressing chronic pain disorder.  While the Guidelines do not have the force of law, they are intended to assist practitioners in the safe prescribing and dispensing of opioids.


If  you have any questions about the Medical Treatment Guidelines, changes to the Medical Fee Schedule, or any other topics, please contact any of the attorneys at Lee & Brown.


The Ongoing Dilemma of Intermittent FMLA Leave

Intermittent FMLA leave is a giant thorn in the side of humanFMLA Leave resource professionals across the country. The struggle is that not all intermittent leave requests are equal. Here’s a look at some of the most common scenarios, and how to handle them. The FMLA allows employers some flexibility in granting different kinds of intermittent leave. Employees are entitled to take it for serious health conditions, either their own or those of immediate family members. The law also allows use of intermittent leave for child care after the birth or placement of an adopted child, but only if the employer agrees to it. It’s the company’s call. It’s not always simple, however. If the mother develops complications from childbirth, or the infant is born premature and suffers from health problems, the “serious health condition” qualifier would likely kick in. As always, it pays to know the medical details before making a decision.


Eligibility Is Not Automatic

Companies can successfully dispute employee claims to FMLA eligibility. Consider this real-life example: 

A female employee in Maine said she suffered from a chronic condition that made it difficult to make it to work on time. After she racked up a number of late arrivals – and refused an offer to work on another shift – she was fired. She sued, saying her tardiness should have been considered intermittent leave. Her medical condition caused her lateness, she claimed, so each instance should have counted as a block of FMLA leave. Problem was, she’d never been out of work for medical treatment, or on account of a flare-up of her condition. The only time it affected her was when it was time to go to work. 

The Court denied her claim for FMLA eligibility and indicated that intermittent leave is granted when an employee needs to miss work for a specific period of time, such as a doctor’s appointment or when a condition suddenly becomes incapacitating.  That wasn’t the case here, the judge said – and giving the employee FMLA protection would simply have given the woman a blanket excuse to break company rules.

Cite: Brown v. Eastern Maine Medical Center.


Designating Leave Retroactively

In order to maximize workers’ using up their allotted FMLA leave, employers can sometimes classify an absence retroactively. For example, an employee’s out on two weeks of vacation, but she spends the second week in a hospital recovering from pneumonia. Her employer doesn’t learn of the hospital stay until she returns to work. But she tells her supervisor about it, who then informs HR. Within two days, HR contacts the woman and says, “That week you were in the hospital should be covered by the FMLA. Here’s the paperwork.” The key here is that the company acted quickly – within two days of being notified of the qualifying leave. The tactic’s perfectly legal, and it could make a difference in the impact FMLA leave time could have on the firm’s overall operation. It’s also an excellent example of the key role managers play in helping companies deal with the negative effects of FMLA.


Using Employees’ Paid Time Off

Employers should never tell workers they can’t take FMLA leave until they’ve used up all their vacation, sick and other paid time off (PTO). Instead, companies can require employees to use their accrued PTO concurrently with their intermittent leave time. Employers can also count workers’ comp or short-term disability leave as part of their FMLA time – but in that case, employees can’t be asked to use their accrued PTO.


The Transfer Position

Companies can temporarily transfer an employee on intermittent leave, to minimize the effect of that person’s absence on the overall operation. The temporary position doesn’t need to be equivalent to the original job – but the pay and benefits must remain the same. And, of course, the employee must be given his old job – or its equivalent – when the intermittent leave period’s over.

There is one large restriction – the move can’t be made if the transfer “adversely affects” the individual. An example would be if if the new position would lengthen or increase the cost of the employee’s commute.  This would adversely affect the employee. Instead, such transfers need to be handled in such a way as to avoid looking like the employer is trying to discourage the employee from taking intermittent leave – or worse yet, is being punished for having done so.



Although FMLA is certainly an employee-friendly statute, employers do have some rights when it comes to scheduling intermittent leave. For instance, employees are required to consult with their employers about setting up medical treatments on a schedule that minimizes impact on operations. Of course, the arrangement has to be approved by the healthcare provider. But if an employee fails to consult with HR before scheduling treatment, the law allows employers to require the worker to go back to the provider and discuss alternate arrangements.


The Firing Question

Yes, companies can fire an employee who’s on intermittent FMLA leave. Despite the fears of many employers, FMLA doesn’t confer some kind of special dispensation for workers who exercise their leave rights. Obviously, workers can’t be fired for taking leave. But employers can layoff, discipline and terminate those employees who violate company policies or perform poorly. When an employee on FMLA leave is terminated, the Department of Labor decrees that the burdens on the employer to prove the worker would have been laid off, disciplined or terminated regardless of the leave request or usage.


Reductions in Force

When an employer has a valid reason for reducing its workforce, the company can lay off an employee on FMLA leave – as long as the firm can prove the person would have been let go regardless of the leave. However, again companies should be prepared not only to prove the business necessity of the move, but to show an objective, nondiscriminatory plan for choosing which employees would be laid off.


Misconduct or Poor Performance

Employees on FMLA leave – of any type – are just as responsible for following performance and behavior rules as those not on leave. However, companies that fire an employee out on FMLA will be under increased pressure to prove that the decision was based on factors other than the worker’s absence. As such, courts might well pose employers a key question: Why didn’t you fire this person before he/she took leave? This is not an easy answer to explain before a jury if liability is threatened at trial.  The good news is that a number of courts have upheld employers’ rights to fire employees on FMLA leave, even when the employee’s problems were first discovered when the employee went off the job. Nevertheless, companies should move cautiously if they are to terminate an employee currently out on leave due to misconduct or poor performance existing prior to the leave, but discovered after the leave begins.


Every case is different and requires different strategies and decisions because of the intricacies of the FMLA.  Hence, we highly recommend consulting in-house counsel, or one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, to assist in making the appropriate decisions.

New Rule 11 – How’s It Going?

We’re now going on almost three months since the new Rule 11 took effect with the updated DIME fees and procedures.  Time flies, doesn’t it?   There has been some litigation that has ensued as a result of the recent changes, but overall the changes have been well received.  This is likely because most people prepared adequately for the changes that were taking effect well before the start of the New Year.


The litigation that has ensued has been primarily regarding the “regions” listed in the checklist contained on the Application for DIME and the body parts involved in the claim.   Since the “regions” have caused some confusion, the fees have also needed clarification.   Some of the litigation revolved around the specific body parts to a claim and Rule 11’s breakdown of cost.   The checklist looks as follows:


2019 DIME Application


Above each set of body parts, the boxes are listed as regions.  Pursuant to Rule 11, “less than three regions” is a fee of $1,000.   “Three or more regions” is a fee of $1,400.   It is recommended to double-check the Applications for DIME that are received to see if compliance with the Rule is met.   Any discrepancies and/or arguments concerning interpretation of the Rule can be handled by the Prehearing Administrative Law Judges.   The Judges have done an outstanding job of interpreting the Rule and correcting many issues for the DIME unit.  Also note, that some of the disputes have resulted in body parts that either were or were not related to the claim.   Such disputes have involved related body parts that should be part of the DIME, however claimants have tried to keep them out to lower the overall costs of the DIME.   Other disputes have arisen between the terms “and/or” as used in the Rule.  The arguments pertaining to the semantics have been resolved mostly using the word “or” to imply that either one or the other conditions must be met to trigger a particular fee.



In general, the DIME process seems to be running smoothly and interpretation of the new Rules seems to be pretty straightforward.   Like any Rule change, it will take some time to get used to and iron out the wrinkles.  It is important to double-check the new Rule and make sure compliance is met to avoid missing any particular arguments that will pose any sort of leverage in a claim.   Recall, that the new Rule only applies to Notices and Proposals filed on or after January 1, 2019.   Any Notice and Proposal filed before that date adheres to the old Rule 11.


If you have any questions regarding the changes to the Rules or the updated statutes, feel free to contact any of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.


The Legal Buzz – Lee & Brown Newsletter and Case Law Update February 2019

Lee and Brown LLC Partners and Certifications

Thank you for taking the time to read our Firm newsletter. Our newsletter provides a monthly update
on recent developments within our Firm, as well as in the insurance defense community.
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In the News
Lee & Brown LLC was a sponsor for the Professionals in Workers’ Compensation of Colorado annual bowling tournament. The PWC is a professional organization made up of third-party administrators, carriers, attorneys from both sides of the Bar, and professional vendors offering services in the industry. The PWC provides ongoing educational seminars pertaining to the workers’ compensation industry throughout the year. The PWC also funds two collegiate scholarships to high school students interested in studying an area connected to the industry. The PWC bowling tournament is one of the fundraising opportunities from which funding is provided for these scholarships. Lee & Brown fielded two teams this year including Members Joshua Brown and John Abraham; Of Counsel Frank Cavanaugh, M. Frances McCracken and Brad Hansen; and Associates Matt Boatwright, Jessica Melson, and Angela Lavery. A great time was had by all for a good cause while fostering professional development and connections in the Colorado Workers’ Compensation community.

Noteworthy Cases

Associate Daniel Mowrey successfully defended Claimant’s request to reopen his Arizona claim and add an additional body part in Szach v. SW Ambulance, ICA No. 20160-260291. Claimant sustained an admitted industrial injury on January 12, 2016. The Claimant was placed at stationary status and provided with no impairment rating or ongoing treatment on April 2, 2018. Claimant protested the closure of his claim and sought continuing medical benefits and/or an increased impairment rating. Claimant also sought to link an upper body injury and subsequent surgery to the admitted claim. The ALJ credited the testimony of Respondents’ medical expert, who opined that the upper body injury and subsequent surgery was not related to Claimant’s admitted injury. Respondents’ medical expert further credibly testified that Claimant required no additional medical care for his admitted injury. Respondents also presented medical evidence of a preexisting upper body injury. The ALJ concluded that, based on the objective medical evidence and the credible opinion of Respondents’ expert, Claimant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to an increase in permanent impairment or additional medical care. The ALJ further opined that the upper body injury was not related to the admitted injury. The ALJ ordered Claimant’s claim for additional benefits be denied and dismissed.



Workplace Bullying

Does workers’ compensation insurance cover mental and manifesting physical injuries resulting from workplace bullying? A recent Forbes online article cited a survey concluding that 75% of the U.S. workforce reported having experienced workplace bullying. Another study cited by the Workplace Bullying Institute suggested that absenteeism and lower production costs businesses $4 billion annually. Regardless of the accuracy of the statistics, with the increased use of social media, workplace bullying can start inside of the workplace, or start outside of the workplace and permeate into daily business operations. Continue reading the article


Cases You Should Know
Beat the Clock: Statute of Limitations Applies to Both Employers and Claimants: In Packard v. City and County of Denver, W.C. No. 4-925-466 (December 4, 2018), Claimant contracted cancer that he believed was work related. Claimant reported the cancer to his Employer, and the Employer filed a First Report of Injury accordingly. The Claimant did not file a Workers’ Claim for Compensation or an Application for Hearing for 4 years. Pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-43-103(2), an Employee’s right to workers’ compensation benefits is barred if the Employee does not file a Workers’ Claim for Compensation or Application for Hearing within 2 years of the date of injury. When Claimant filed an Application for Hearing 4 years later, Respondents argued that the Employee was not entitled to relief because he did not file a Workers’ Claim for Compensation or Application for Hearing within the two-year period required by statute. The ALJ ruled that Claimant did not violate the two-year statute of limitations because the Employer was aware of the Employee’s claim for compensation via the First Report of Injury and General Admission of Liability filed by the Employer. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office overturned the ALJ’s decision, ruling that that Claimant was not entitled to relief because he did not file a Workers’ Claim for Compensation or Application for Hearing within 2 years of the date of his injury, as required by C.R.S. § 8-43-103(2).

Moral of the story: The Employer’s First Report of Injury is not a substitute for, or the equivalent of, a claimant filing a Workers’ Claim for Compensation. A claimant must timely file a claim in order to comply with C.R.S § 8-43-103 (2), otherwise his or her workers’ compensation claim is barred by the statute of limitations.


Claimant’s Bitter Pill to Swallow: Medical Treatment After MMI Must be Authorized: In Gosselova v. Vail Resorts, W.C. No. 4-975-232 (December 24, 2018), pro se Claimant sought review of an Order denying unauthorized medical treatment Claimant obtained after maximum medical improvement (MMI). Claimant sustained an admitted injury to her knee and subsequently underwent three knee surgeries. Claimant’s ATP recommended that Claimant undergo a fourth surgery for hardware removal. Claimant refused the recommended surgical treatment and was placed at MMI with recommended maintenance care to include hardware removal. Without receiving prior authorization, Claimant obtained hardware removal surgery from another physician. The Industrial Claim Appeals Court upheld the ALJ’s determination that even though Claimant’s treatment was reasonable and necessary, because it was not authorized by Respondents, Respondents were not liable for payment of the treatment.

Moral of the story: Even if medical treatment may be contemplated in the future, once Claimant reaches MMI, prior authorization is required. There is no legal authority that requires Respondents to pay for unauthorized medical treatment pre or post-MMI.


Safety Rule Violations: In Heien v. DW Crossland LLC, W.C. No. 5-059-799 (November 29, 2018), Claimant sought to overcome an Order reducing the non-medical workers’ compensation benefits by 50% for his willful violation to obey a safety rule. In this case, the Employer had an established safety rule that employees were not to open washing machines while the spin cycle was ongoing. Claimant sustained a severe amputation injury to his right arm when he violated the Employer’s safety rule by opening a washing machine while it was still running. Claimant admitted to using heroin during his shift and stated he opened the machine to retrieve a Coca-Cola bottle as he was concerned the sheets being washed would be damaged. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reduced Claimant’s non-medical workers’ compensation benefits by 50% to account for his willful failure to obey a safety rule. Claimant appealed this reduction in benefits by arguing that his violation of the safety rule was not willful because he had a plausible purpose in violating the safety rule. Additionally, he argued that the safety rule was not enforced by the Employer. ICAO affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the Employer’s safety rule was enforced because there were posted warning signs above the washing machine and there was a switch located directly beside the machine that could be pulled to immediately cut power to the machine. The Panel noted the obviousness of the risk in affirming the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s effort to save sheets from being damaged was not a plausible purpose for violating the enforced safety rule.


Moral of the Story: The violation of a safety rule is not considered willful if the employee had a plausible purpose to explain the violation of the rule. However, if the inherent danger in violating the safety rule is obvious, Claimant’s actions in violating the safety rule will rarely, if ever, be found plausible.

Workplace Bullying

Does workers’ compensation insurance cover mental, and manifesting physical injuries Workplace Bullyingresulting from workplace bullying? A recent Forbes online article cited a survey concluding that 75% of the U.S. workforce reported having experienced workplace bullying.[1] Another study cited by the Workplace Bullying Institute suggested that absenteeism and lower production costs businesses $4 billion annually.[2] Regardless of the accuracy of the statistics, with the increased use of social media, workplace bullying can start inside of the workplace, or, start outside of the workplace and permeate into daily business operations.

One definition of workplace bullying advanced in Psychology Today was “workplace bullying refers to “situations where an employee repeatedly and over a prolonged time period is exposed to harassing behavior from one or more colleagues (including subordinates and leaders) and where the targeted person is unable to defend him-/herself against this systematic mistreatment.”[3] Researches have identified both internal and external causes of workplace bullying. As noted below, identifying the cause of workplace bullying is relevant to unwinding the legal liabilities associated with resulting injuries. Types of injuries associated with this behavior includes “physical and psychological symptoms, including headaches, chronic neck pain, fibromyalgia, type 2 diabetes, sleep problems, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress symptoms, suicidal ideation, and others.” [4]

The current statutory law in Colorado does not specifically address a company’s insurance liability for workplace bullying injuries. However, those injuries can be covered under the exclusive remedy of the Colorado’s Workers’ Compensation Act and the associated insurance policies. Bullying injuries may be treated as assaults for purposes of liability. Assaults that arise out of work are generally compensable injuries, while those that are purely personal are not.[5] Assaults caused by a natural force, or an event that any employee would be exposed to are also compensable assaults. Before addressing the nature of the injury, the business should investigate whether the bullying, for example verbal abuse or written harassments, arose out of a personal dispute between employees or whether the bullying occurred within the parameters of the employees’ business relations. Any investigation should be undertaken consistent with a business’ employment policies and procedures for interviewing witnesses, reviewing internal documents such as email, and confiscating company phones or computers as evidence.

When a business determines that a workplace bullying event has occurred, the business ought to determine whether an actual injury was caused by the perpetrator(s) conduct. The law is especially tricky when unpacking whether an injury occurred. While an employee may complain of stress or some other symptoms, especially to justify absenteeism, the claim may not always be a compensable injury. Section 8-43-301(2)(a), C.R.S., requires that an employee claiming a mental impairment provide a specific showing of a mental injury, including evidence supported by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. Additionally, whether the bullying itself was a crime of violence will also factor into the amount of benefits that could be owed to a victim-employee. Navigating through the patchwork of questions to determine liability hinges on the ability of a comprehensive investigation of the claim at the outset to determine its validity.

As always, if you have any questions regarding workers’ compensation insurance and laws, please contact one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.





[4] Id.

[5] Velasquez v. Industrial Commission, 41 Colo. App. 201,581 P.2d 748 (1978); In Re Questions Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17, 23 (Colo. 1988).

The Legal Buzz – Lee & Brown Newsletter and Case Law Update January 2019

Lee and Brown LLC Partners and Certifications

Thank you for taking the time to read our Firm newsletter. Our newsletter provides a monthly update
on recent developments within our Firm, as well as in the insurance defense community.
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Noteworthy Cases

Member Karen Gail Treece successfully defended two full contest claims. In Mommens v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., W.C. No. 5-070-386, Claimant alleged he was injured from hitting a bump on the road while driving a cement truck. Claimant testified he drove over a bump or transition in the road and flew up in his seat hitting the lumbar bar of the seat when he came down. Claimant was unable to identify the street location of the bump to his supervisors. Respondents’ accident reconstructionist expert credibly testified there was nothing wrong with the seat of the truck, the lumbar bar did not protrude, and the seat operated properly. The ALJ denied and dismissed the claim.

In Pickering v. Hercules Commercial, W.C. No. 5-049-650, Claimant alleged he was injured while tightening a bolt using an allen/hex wrench. Ms. Treece elicited credible witness testimony that Claimant complained of pain and was on light duty prior to the alleged date of injury. Respondents’ expert persuasively testified it was unlikely a person could exert sufficient force, using a ¼ inch hex wrench, to sustain a significant shoulder injury. The ALJ denied and dismissed Claimant’s request for benefits.


In Robinson v. United Parcel Service, Member Joseph W. Gren and Associate Daniel Mowrey successfully defended against Claimant’s allegation that a specific medical center was an authorized provider. Claimant contended that he was referred to the emergency room to rule out a medical emergency. Claimant declared that Respondents were liable for payment for all services at said facility. Respondents’ argued that the initial referral was for emergent care only. Once the emergent care was concluded, Claimant returned to his ATP for ongoing treatment. Respondents produced medical evidence from the ATP that no additional referral was made to the other facility. The ALJ opined that Claimant returned to treat at the other facility of his own accord. The ALJ concluded that, based on the objective medical evidence, Claimant failed to establish that the other facility was authorized as treating physicians. The ALJ ordered that the care received from the other facility, after the ER visit, was unauthorized.


Of Counsel Frank Cavanaugh and Associate Kristi Robarge successfully defeated a full contest claim in Putnam v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., W.C. 5-079-453. Claimant alleged an injury occurred while at work; however, there were conflicting reports of the injury. At first, Claimant simply reported that she began hurting while at work. She later reported that she bent over to pick something up and felt a pop in her low back. In addition to the inconsistent reports of injury, Claimant had a pre-existing condition which caused pain in multiple places. The ALJ found that Claimant did not suffer a compensable injury during the course and scope of her employment. The ALJ noted that “the mere fact a claimant experiences symptoms while performing work does not require the inference that there has been an aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition.”


Associate Angela Lavery successfully defended Claimant’s claim for specific medical benefits in Hayes v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., W.C. 5-062-811. Claimant worked as a “roughneck” on an oil rig and argued that he suffered an injury to his upper extremity when he sustained an admitted injury. Claimant argued that he required shoulder surgery recommended by an ATP surgeon, which would include several procedures. Although the ALJ agreed that Claimant suffered a work-related injury, the ALJ determined that Claimant failed to establish that the recommendation for surgery was medically reasonable and necessary. The ALJ credited the testimony of Respondents’ medical expert, who opined that surgery was not reasonable or necessary based on Claimant’s current presentation of symptoms and the Medical Treatment Guidelines. Respondents’ medical expert credibly testified that other more conservative treatment modalities could be utilized based on Claimant’s reported symptoms and objective findings on exam. The ALJ agreed and determined that there was insufficient evidence to support that the surgery should be performed over other treatment options. The ALJ denied Claimant’s request for authorization of the surgery.

In Moore v. Lifeline Orlando VAC, (DaVita), I.C.A. No. 20152-740314, Associate Daniel Mowrey successfully defended against Claimant’s attempt to increase the Loss of Earning Capacity (LEC) and Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) Award before the Industrial Commission of Arizona. Respondents admitted for a monthly PPD award of $646.10. Claimant contended that she was entitled to a monthly award of $1,094.13. Claimant provided expert testimony from two physicians and a labor market expert. The ALJ was persuaded by the testimony of Respondents’ labor market expert who testified that while Claimant could not return to her pre-injury employment, her considerable history in leadership roles provided her extensive administrative experience. The ALJ credited Respondents’ labor market expert’s opinion that her prior leadership roles would qualify her for the higher wage range for administrative positions. The ALJ was not persuaded by Claimant’s testimony that she could not sit for longer than 15 minutes at a time. The ALJ concluded that, based on the objective medical evidence and the credible opinion of Respondents’ expert, Claimant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to an increase in her LEC and PPD award. The ALJ ordered Claimant’s claim for an increase in benefits be denied and dismissed.

Helmet to Helmet

It’s hard to believe that the 2018 NFL football season is coming to an end soon with Super Bowl LIII. And for the 16th time in 18 years a quarterback named Brady, Manning, or Roethlisberger will represent the AFC in the Super Bowl. This will be the 9th appearance for Patriot’s Quarterback Tom Brady while the Ram’s Quarterback Jared Goff makes his first appearance. The old vs. the new.

While we are indulging in hot wings, pizza, and libations at various Super Bowl parties, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that injuries to professional athletes fall under workers’ compensation insurance. Since these players are performing their job duties and, unlike amateur athletes, they are employees. Continue reading the article


Cases You Should Know

No Mulligans for Bad Faith: In Schultz v. GEICO Casualty Company (November 5, 2018) the Supreme Court of Colorado addressed a District Court Order that required the Plaintiff to undergo an IME in light of bad faith allegations brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was involved in a car accident in 2015 and subsequently had multiple knee surgeries. Without having Plaintiff undergo an IME, the insurer offered full policy limits but did not subsequently pay. When Plaintiff brought a bad faith allegation against the insurer for unreasonable delay/denial, the insurer then denied liability and secured an Order from the District Court requiring Plaintiff to undergo an IME to assess a causation dispute. Plaintiff alleged that the requirement that she undergo an IME was unreasonable because the insurer had previously agreed to pay out the policy without an examination, over a year prior. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that an insurer’s decision to deny or delay benefits to the insured must be evaluated based on the information available to the insurer at the time the coverage decision is made, not post-coverage decision due to the discovery of later developments that may have impacted the insurer’s decision. Here, the insurer had initially decided to pay out the policy without an IME and presented no explanation as to how an IME performed one year later would have impacted the original decision. The Court found that the District Court had abused its discretion in compelling the examination.


Moral of the Story: Whether an insurer acted in bad faith or not, is decided when the unreasonable action is alleged to have occurred. It cannot be rectified by relying upon evidence subsequently obtained that did not exist, or was not available, at the time of the initial action.


Fines Dispensed, Dispensary Incensed: In MMJ 95, LLC (no board number issued)(October 15, 2018), ICAO upheld a Director’s Order imposing a $39,950.00 fine upon Respondent-employer for failing to maintain mandatory workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Section 8-44-101, C.R.S. of the Workers’ Compensaion Act requires that all employers secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for all employees. Uninsured employers are subject to a fine of up to $250.00 per day under Section 8-43-409(1)(b), C.R.S. In this case, MMJ 95 did not maintain its own workers’ compensation coverage. The sole registered agent of MMJ 95 was also the registered agent of another company, AJC Industries, LLC, which did maintain workers’ compensation coverage. Both businesses operated under the same trade name. The Director found that, contrary to the testimony of the employer, MMJ 95 did have “employees” for purposes of the Act and therefore had to maintain its own insurance for those employees. The Director found that the registered agent of Repondent-employer did not file LLC member rejection of coverage for workers’ compensation insurance for MMJ 95 and was therefore himself considered an “employee” of the company. The Director further found that persons working at MMJ 95 were employees, despite testimony from the registered agent that these persons were employed by AJC and therefore covered by its insurance. The Director found that, even though AJC and MMJ 95 operated under the same tradename, they were separate business entities because they had been filed as such with the Secretary of State. Respondent-employer did not properly raise contentions of error in response to the Director’s Order and ICAO upheld the Director’s findings and ultimate fine.


Moral of the Story: Every employer registered with the Secretary of State must maintain its own workers’ compensation insurance coverage for all employees. Members of Limited Liability Companies may be considered employees of the company for purposes of workers’ compensation, even though they are not paid as employees of the company.


A Final Admission Isn’t Always the End: In The Matter of the Claim of Carold Peoples v. State of Colo. Dep’t of Trans., W.C. No. 4-819-262 (October 24, 2018), ICAO affirmed the ALJ’s Order requiring Claimant to repay an overpayment and allowing Respondent to recoup the overpayment by offsetting disfigurement benefits. Claimant had been awarded SSDI and Respondent did not take an offset against temporary disability, even though they had known of the award since 2012. Respondent instead noted an ongoing overpayment on the GAL. Respondent filed a FAL in 2013, within a year of the SSDI award, but did not apply for a hearing. Claimant argued that overpayment was barred by the statute of limitations on the premise that Respondent did not “attempt to recover” the overpayment within one year of when they became aware of the overpayment, under Section 8-42-113.5(1)(b.5)(I), C.R.S. ICAO agreed with the ALJ that asserting a right to recoup overpayment on the FAL was sufficient for Respondent to preserve their right and defeat the statute of limitations. Filing a FAL asserting an overpayment against future benefits is sufficient as an “attempt to recover” an overpayment for purposes of the statute. Claimant argued that Respondent was prohibited from offsetting the overpayment against future benefits owed. The Panel held that “the Respondent may offset their liability for the disfigurement award . . . against the existing overpayment.”


Moral of the story: Respondents must attempt to recover any overpayment within a year of becoming aware of its existence, and a FAL noting the overpayment is sufficient to preserve the right to pursue the overpayment in the future. Respondents may also recover overpayment from future benefits, including disfigurement owed.

Helmet to Helmet

It’s hard to believe that the 2018 NFL football season is coming to an end soon with Super Bowl LIII. And for the 16th time in 18 years a quarterback named Brady, Manning, or Roethlisberger will represent the AFC in the Super Bowl. This will be the 9th appearance for Patriot’s Quarterback Tom Brady while the Ram’s Quarterback Jared Goff makes his first appearance. The old vs. the new.

While we are indulging in hot wings, pizza, and libations at various Super Bowl parties, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that injuries to professional athletes fall under workers’ compensation insurance. Since these players are performing their job duties and, unlike amateur athletes, they are employees.

Professional football requires two types of insurance: general liability and workers’ compensation since it is mandatory under state laws. Given the lucrative contracts these athletes sign, the Collective Bargaining Agreements often require wage continuation agreements so that these athletes continue to make the same salary if they are injured and off work. Can you imagine an athlete who makes $30 million a year being capped at the state workers’ compensation rate while recovering from an injury? Hence why wage continuation agreements are standard across the league.

With that said, one of the biggest threats to the NFL is the evaporating insurance market. According to multiple sources from the NFL, there is only one carrier willing to provide workers’ compensation coverage for NFL teams because of all the concussion litigation that began in 2011. At that time, at least a dozen carriers occupied the insurance market for pro football. Now, there is one.  Dr. Julian Bales, Medical Director and member of the NFL’s head, neck, and spine committee told ESPN “insurance coverage is arguably the biggest threat to the sport.”[1]

A study done by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s sports concussion program found approximately 300,000 football-related concussions occur each year in youth, high school, college, and professional. And the biggest injury or disease that is making headlines in the NFL is traumatic brain injuries and chronic traumatic encephalopathy or “C.T.E.” The problem with this disease is the unknown “trigger” on how and when the disease starts. The disease is diagnosed after death and the symptoms of depression and delusional behavior may lay dormant for years, or even decades, before they surface. It’s concerning for carriers to know they could be on the hook years down the road given the unknown.

Similar to asbestos claims in workers’ compensation, a carrier can be at risk for a claimant who works one day and is subsequently diagnosed with lung cancer, players in California could file claims, even if they played only one game, to allege their brain disorders were caused by the sport. This cost carriers and the leagues hundreds of millions of dollars which fortunately was curtailed by new legislation in 2013. Still, carriers are cautious to cover the NFL without an exclusion for head trauma.

For many years carriers insured the NFL without restrictions for traumatic brain injuries. Now many of these companies are in a six-year lawsuit with the NFL over who will pay legal fees and claims associated with the 2013 settlement of the $1 billion-dollar class action lawsuit. Hence, these carriers are at higher risk to insure the NFL.

California has one of the most liberal workers’ compensation laws in the Union. Recently, former players who decades ago reached injury settlements with NFL teams and carriers have filed new claims alleging their settlements did not cover traumatic brain injuries. In 2015, a workers’ compensation court found that a former player’s 1989 settlement for cumulative industrial injury “does not extend to the then-unknown cumulative injury to the brain.” Similar to a worker who claims their shoulder pain is due to years of lifting heavy equipment, a former football player can argue their continued migraine headaches are a result of them playing professional football. Chances are several brain disorders like dementia, Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s could be blamed on football. Doctors may ask, “how long did you play football and how many head injuries did you have?” and cite that as the cause for a claimant’s brain disorder when a claim against the NFL is filed. Fortunately, claimants must still meet their burden and prove that pro football alone, and not youth or college football, was the “cause” of their injury or diseases.

Workers’ compensation attorneys in California are handling numerous settled cases in which former NFL players have filed new claims for head trauma. The new claims will only increase costs for litigation and further deter carriers on what they will and will not cover. Fortunately, monetary costs for workers’ compensation claims are capped which will help put a cork in the damn but if the floodgate of old settled claims are allowed to be reopened, the market for coverage will continue to be washed away down the river…

As always, if you have any questions regarding workers’ compensation insurance and laws, please contact one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.



Rules Are Meant to be Broken – or At Least Updated. 2019 Rule Updates

2019 brings changes to two Rules that affect Colorado Workers’ Compensation. Rule 11 and Rule 16 have both been revised and the changes go into effect January 1, 2019. The changes to Rule 11and the DIME process are extensive. Below is a brief summary of the changes.


Rule 16 is undergoing a few changes.  The rule has been reordered.  Most of the changes are not substantive.  It is strongly recommended that the new rule be referenced in dealing with any prior authorization or billing issue for specifics.  The more substantive changes are highlighted below; however, the specifics of the rule should be reviewed in each situation.

  • ‘Payer’ definition is the same, but the definition now states that use of third parties to pay bills does not relieve the carrier or self-insured employer of obligations under the rules.
  • Recognized healthcare providers previously under 16-5 is now under 16-3.
  • Required use of the medical treatment guidelines, previously under 16-3 is now under 16-4
  • Notification requirements previously under 16-9 is now under 16-5.
  • Prior authorization previously under 16-10 is now under 16-6
  • Contest of prior authorization previously under 16-11 is now under 16-7.

* In conjunction with 16-11 in the new rule governing payment of medical benefits, contest for payment of prior authorization for non-medical reasons now contains examples of non-medical reasons including: no claim has been filed, compensability is not been established, the provider is not authorized, insurance coverage is at issue, typographic, gender or date errors on the bill, failure to submit medical documentation and unrecognized CPT codes.

  • Required use of the medical fee schedule previously under 16-4 is now under 16-8 and specifically sets forth the payment for build services without an established value under the medical fee schedule require prior authorization.
  • Required billing forms and accompanying documentation previously under 16-7 is now under 16-9 and has been added to somewhat.
  • Required medical documentation previously under 16-8 is now under 16-10 and sets forth in greater detail specifically what Form 164 should look like from the doctor’s office.
  • Payment of medical benefits previously under 16-12 is now under16-11.
  • Dispute resolution process previously under 16-13 is now under 16-12.
  • On-site review of hospital or other medical charges previously under 16-14 is folded into 16-10 regarding required medical record documentation.


Rule 11 changes are more substantial. Of Counsel, Brad Hansen, wrote an article about the updates last month and you can read it as well: Because It Goes to 11 – Rule 11 changes for 2019. 


The following is a brief summary of the Rule 11 changes:


  • No real change for years.
  • Doctors’ reluctance to continue to do DIMEs due to reimbursement and increased complexity.


Effective Date

  • January 1, 2019
  • DOWC says there is some leeway for the first month.


Overview of changes

  • Cost
  • Forms
  • Time-frames
  • Logistics



  • 3 tiers based on DOI, and number of body parts
  • $1,000 = DOI < 2 years and < 3 regions marked on the application
  • $1,400 = DOI > 2 years but < 5 years and 3 – 4 body regions marked
  • $2,000 = DOI > 5 years and ≥ 5 or more body regions marked



  • FAL – includes objection to the FAL, notice proposal and application for DIME
  • Request for Appointment to the DIME
  • Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME
  • DIME Examiner Summary Sheet
  • Notice of DIME Negotiations
  • Follow-up DIME
  • DIME Physician Summary Disclosure Form
  • Notice of Reschedule or Termination of DIME
  • Notice of Agreement to Limit the Scope of the DIME
  • DIME Report Template


Time-frames – font color corresponds to responsible party. Key to color below list.

  • FAL = 30 Days After Receipt of MMI (calendar 30 days after report for safety)
  • Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME = 30 Days After Filing of FAL
  • Claimant Files for Indigency = 15 Days After Filing the Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME
  • Attempt to Negotiate DIME = 30 Days After Notice and Proposal and Application (Notice of Negotiation Form to be filed within 30 Days)
  • DOWC Issues Panel = 5 days
  • Summary Disclosure Request = 5 Business Days
  • Requesting Party Strike If No Disclosure Request = 5 Business Days
  • Non-Requesting Party Strike = 5 Business Days
  • DOWC Send DIME Confirmation = 5 Business Days
  • Pay For and Schedule DIME = 14 Days
  • Schedule DIME = Between 35 – 75 Days After DIME Confirmation
  • Complete Copy of Medical Records to Claimant = 14 Days from DIME Confirmation
  • Claimant submits additional Medical Records to Carrier = 10 Days After Medical Packet From Carrier
  • Completed Packet Provided to DIME = 14 Days Before Exam
  • Claimant Notifies Carrier of Need for Interpreter = 14 Days Before Examination
    • Carrier is Responsible for Paying for the Interpreter
  • After DIME = 20 Days After Examination a Report is Generated

Key = Respondent duty       = Claimant duty     = Either Party’s duty



  • New Rule applies to any Notice and Proposal with a certificate of service after 1/1/19
  • Applies to any follow-up DIME after 1/1/19
  • Applies to 24-month DIMEs



  • Body Parts?
    • The checklist proports to control body parts considered
    • PALJs likely to address
    • DIMEs still not confined to specific body parts
  • DIME Cancellation
    • Very tight cancellation time-frames with fixed penalties


The above summaries of Rule 11 and 16 are not intended to be used as legal advice. They are an outline of the changes to those Rules effective January 1, 2019. Please contact an attorney at Lee & Brown for case specific legal recommendations.

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