On June 3, 2019 the Colorado Supreme Court issued a published opinion captioned Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, Division of Workers’ Compensation v. Dami Hospitality, LLC, 2019SC47.  The decision involved a fine handed down by the DOWC against an uninsured employer.


Dami Hospitality, LLC., (Dami) is the owner of a hotel in Denver that employs between 4 and 10 people at any given time.  Dami let its workers’ compensation policy lapse on July 1, 2005.  When notified of the violation for failing to maintain coverage Dami conceded the violation and paid a settlement in June 2006.  Just 2 months later Dami’s coverage lapsed again and it went without coverage from August 10, 2006 to June 8, 2007.  Dami maintained coverage from June 9, 2007 to September 11, 2010, but it’s coverage lapsed on September 12, 2010 and Dami went without coverage until July 9, 2014.

DOWC discovered the lapses and issued a notice requiring Dami to answer a compliance questionnaire and advised that Dami could request the prehearing conference over this issue.  Dami did not respond to this notification so a second notification was sent on June 25, 2014, with a compliance questionnaire and an option to set a prehearing conference.  On July 11, 2014 Dami sent in a certificate of insurance covering Dami from July 10, 2014 to July 10, 2015.

DOWC issued a specific findings of fact, conclusions of law and order dated October 30, 2014 fining Dami $841,200!  Under Section 8-43-409(1),(b), C.R.S.

For every day the employer fails or has failed to ensure to keep the insurance required by articles 40 to 47 of this title in force, allows or has allowed insurance to lapse, or fails or has failed to affect the renewal of such coverage: impose a fine of: (I) not more than two hundred and fifty dollars for an initial violation; or (II) not less than two hundred and fifty dollars or more than five hundred dollars for a second and subsequent violation.

A separate schedule of funds was promulgated under Rule 3-6(D) in conjunction with the statutory section classifying second and subsequent violations as follows:

Class VII 1-20 Days $250/Day

Class VIII 21-25 Days $260/Day

Class IX 26-30 Days $280/Day

Class X 31-35 Days $300/Day

Class XI 36-40 Days $400/Day

Class XII 41 Days $500/Day

The DOWC fine was based on this classification process.  Dami explained that its lapse in coverage was based on its reliance that others maintain coverage and that given its $50,000 a year payroll, it was unable to pay the fine.  DOWC treated Dami’s response as a petition to review and, in an effort to settle the fine dispute, offered to decrease the fine amount to $425,000.  Dami claimed, among other things, that the fine was in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibiting excessive fines.  DOWC declined DAMI’s leniency request citing that the reasons for coverage lapse were within Dami’s control, that discretion on fine amount was not within its power and that it could not address the constitutional arguments.  Dami appealed and at the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) level the issue was sent back to DOWC to consider various mitigating and non-mitigating factors.  The DOWC issued a subsequent Order declining the issue on remand, essentially stating that the graduated fines under the Rule take into account these mitigating and non-mitigating factors.  Dami again appealed to the ICAO which then simply affirmed the DOWC.

The case was ultimately appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals which found that the DOWC abused its discretion by not considering various mitigating and non-mitigating factors as required by applicable case law.  The DOWC then petitioned for certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court.


The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause applies to companies.  It concluded that this clause does apply to companies, finding that companies are subject to similar protections against excessive fines just as individuals.  The Colorado Supreme Court further found that fines are subject to proportionality test to determine if they are excessive.  The Court held that when a fine is imposed on a per diem basis, with each day being a separate violation, evaluation of whether the fine is excessive must be done with each daily fine.  Therefore, the whole matter was sent back to DOWC so the parties could have a potential evidentiary hearing over proportionality considerations.


The DOWC has been in the habit of issuing compliance/show cause orders and subsequent fines against noncomplying employers.  Many of these orders have appeared excessive and were the subject of newspaper articles.  In addition, the DOWC maintains a recently created uninsured fund designed to provide coverage for injured workers hurt on the job working for noncomplying employers.  This fund is, in part, funded by DOWC fines levied against noncomplying employers.  These orders are issued without any mechanism for an evidentiary hearing over the mitigating factors identified by the court in this Dami decision.  Given this decision, it appears evidentiary hearings may now need to be held in conjunction with the compliance/show cause orders issued by DOWC.  Other possible implications include finding or creating new funding mechanisms to help build-up the uninsured employers fund outside of fines and penalties.

If you have any questions about fines, or any other topics, please contact any of the attorneys at Lee & Brown.


The Legal Buzz – Lee & Brown Newsletter and Case Law Update May 2019

Lee and Brown LLC Partners and Certifications

Thank you for taking the time to read our Firm newsletter. Our newsletter provides a monthly update
on recent developments within our Firm, as well as in the insurance defense community.
Lee and Brown Denver AttorneysFollow us on LinkedIn


In the News
L & B Members Katherine Lee and Joe Gren (pictured with Liberty Mutual adjuster Brittany Pintor) were honored to attend the premier of the movie “Two Hearts”  based upon the book “All My Tomorrows.”  The book was written by a Firm client after he suffered the tragic loss of his son.  Both the book and the movie detail the emotional story behind the donor family’s decision and the lives, forever changed, of the recipients and their families. The premier also included a tour of The Gabriel House of Care, built in large part from a donation by one of the organ recipients.  The Gabriel House of Care houses individuals waiting for or recovering from organ transplants, and is conveniently located steps from the Jacksonville, Florida Mayo Transplant Clinic.  Katherine and Joe were honored to be included as guests, and learned a great deal about the gift of organ donation, which inspired a Firm contribution to an amazing and transformative cause.


Noteworthy Cases

Joshua Brown Attorney Denver In McIntyre v. Global Medical Response, W.C. No. 5-078-097, Member Joshua D. Brown and Associate Susanna Thomas-LovricSusanna Thomas-Lovric successfully defended Claimant’s pursuit of specific medical benefits.  Claimant was employed by Global Medical Response as a paramedic for over 20 years, when he slipped and fell down icy stairs in April 2018.  Following the injury, Claimant underwent extensive cervical and lumbar spine surgeries.  Respondents defended against causation and relatedness based on pre-existing injuries and Claimant’s failure to timely report head and neck symptoms to his ATP.  Claimant argued that the fall had aggravated preexisting injuries that were work related, and that his ATP failed to document his cervical spine complaints.  The ALJ denied Claimant’s request for reimbursement for both surgeries.  He found that the cervical spine surgery was not causally related to the workplace injury, but that it was a prophylactic measure related to both Claimant’s degenerative conditions and a preexisting injury.  He also found that the lumbar spine surgery, although reasonable and necessary, was not causally related to the workplace injury because Claimant had a history of lumbar spine complaints and failed to prove that the workplace injury caused an aggravation of same.

Joseph Gren Denver AttorneyMember Joe Grenand Associate Kristi Robarge successfully defended a full contest claimKristi Robarge in Mahoney v. Evraz, W.C. No. 5-084-115.  Claimant alleged an injury to his hip from operation of a cutoff machine while pulling large pieces of pipe down the table.  Claimant made several inconsistent statements to his treating providers, his employer, and to the ALJ.  Respondents’ expert credibly testified that the alleged mechanism of injury would not cause Claimant’s injury.  Respondents’ expert also opined that the cause of Claimant’s symptoms was due to an unrelated condition known as meralgia paresthetica.  The ALJ found Respondents’ expert credible and found Claimant not credible. Hence, the ALJ denied and dismissed Claimant’s claim for compensation.


Matt Boatwright AttorneyAssociate Matt Boatwrightsuccessfully defended a full contest claim in Rose v. Allied Universal, W.C. No. 5-070-620. Claimant claimed that she suffered a knee injury while running to board a train as part of her duties as a security guard.  Claimant had a medical history involving treatment for the same knee prior to the work injury that was not disclosed to the treating provider.  Claimant later disclosed the treatment but gave multiple different accounts of how the preexisting condition arose. Respondents’ expert opined that the alleged mechanism simply was not sufficient to have caused the injuries for which Claimant sought treatment.  The ALJ ultimately found that, while Claimant did experience pain after the event in question, Claimant did not suffer an injury that arose out of and occurred within the course and scope of employment. The ALJ cited inconsistencies in the records that could not be reconciled with testimony. The claim was denied and dismissed.


Associate Matt Boatwrightalso successfully defended against a claim for conversion from an upper extremity impairment to a whole person rating in Tucker v. United Natural Foods Incorporated, W.C. No. 5-043-659. Claimant claimed that he suffered injuries to his neck as part of his work-related shoulder injury that warranted conversion to a whole person impairment.  Claimant had ongoing treatment involving his cervical spine.  While the ALJ did find that Claimant suffered functional loss in the shoulder, he found that the limitations were confined to that body part and did not extend to his neck.  The ALJ found that Claimant had failed to prove that complaints of neck pain and dysfunction arose to the level of functional impairment to that body part.  Accordingly, the ALJ denied Claimant’s request for conversion.



Fran McCracken




Fran McCracken

Colorado is addressing the ongoing opioid epidemic with an array of public and private initiatives.  Per the American Medical Association,  the state Medicaid agency (the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing [HCPF]) and the Division of Insurance (DOI) are spearheading the initiatives.  On March 16, 2018, the revised Guidelines for Prescribing and Dispensing Opioids were adopted by all six of Colards: the Colorado Dental Board, the Colorado Medical Board, the State Board of Nursing, the State Board of Optometry, the Colorado Podiatry Board and the State Board of Pharmacy.   Continue reading this article


Cases You Should Know

It’s All Fun and Games – Even if You Get Hurt: In Schniedwind v. Rite of Passage, W.C. No. 5-051-507-03 (March 12, 2019), Claimant worked as a licensed therapist for the employer. She alleged she sustained a work-related injury riding a bicycle while accompanying a team of students. The ALJ found the cycling excursion was a recreational activity. Additionally, the ALJ held that, although Claimant’s participation in the ride conferred a benefit to the employer, her injuries were not compensable because her participation in the activity was voluntary. The panel upheld the ALJ’s Order as the findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Moral of the story: When participation in a recreational activity is voluntary, injuries resulting from participation in this kind of activity are not compensable.


Seconds Anyone?: In Davoli v. University of Colorado, W.C. No. 5-068-419-001 (March 15, 2019), Claimant sustained an admitted head injury when she hit her head on a counter.  While receiving treatment for the admitted claim, Claimant hit her head again on an x-ray machine at work.  The second incident was treated under the first admitted claim and there was no lost time associated with the second incident.  The ATP was aware of both events and opined that the diagnosis and treatment remained the same.  Respondents never filed a second claim for the second incident.  The parties went to hearing on the second claim for compensability and benefits.  The ALJ found that since there was no lost time, no permanent impairment, and the claim was administered under the first injury, the claim was denied.  On review, ICAO remanded the case for further findings indicating that the claimant suffered a compensable injury if the second incident of hitting her head on the X-ray machine caused the need for medical treatment or disability.

Moral of the story:  If a new incident aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a pre-existing injury and causes the need for medical treatment, a second claim should be filed – even if there is no resulting disability.


FAL the Void: In Martin v. Jack in the Box d/b/a Qdoba Mexican Grill, W.C. No. 4-968-114-01 (March 15, 2019), Claimant sought review of an Order that denied and dismissed his claim and ordered that the FAL was void ab initio. To deem the FAL void ab initio would mean the document was never filed. Claimant was assaulted behind the restaurant and Respondents admitted liability on the claim. Claimant reported to his employer and police officers that the assault was random; however, further investigation, after the FAL was filed, showed that the assault was personal in nature. If an assault is personal in nature, resulting injuries are not compensable. In re Question by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir., 759 P.2d 17 (Colo.). Claimant argued that there was no statutory authority to permit an admission to be retroactively withdrawn or revoked and argued that Respondents needed to reopen the claim to terminate future benefits.  ICAO determined that case law allowed declaring admissions void ab initio and affirmed the ALJ’s Order.

Moral of the story: If additional investigation after a FAL is filed proves that the injury is not compensable, a judge can find the admission was void from the outset.

The Legal Buzz – Lee & Brown Newsletter and Case Law Update April 2019

Lee and Brown LLC Partners and Certifications

Thank you for taking the time to read our Firm newsletter. Our newsletter provides a monthly update
on recent developments within our Firm, as well as in the insurance defense community.
Lee and Brown Denver AttorneysFollow us on LinkedIn


In the News


Lee & Brown LLC, is pleased to announce all 5 Members, Katherine M. Lee, Joshua D. Brown, Karen Gail Treece, Joseph Gren and John Abraham, have been selected by Super Lawyers for 2019. Mr. Abraham joins the team for the first year as a Rising Star.  Super Lawyers evaluates lawyers across the country for its annual list of top attorneys.  Each candidate is measured against 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. Lee & Brown is very proud of the recognition.



Noteworthy Cases

Member Joshua D. Brown and Of Counsel William M. Sterck successfully defended a Willam Sterck Attorneydeath claim in Ordonez-Gamez v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., W.C. No. 5-079-980. The Decedent was staying at a hotel in Denver for flight training and was in travel status during this period.  One evening, after completing a difficult test, the Decedent went out drinking with a co-pilot. Before returning to his hotel, while heavily intoxicated, the Decedent ran into a busy road and was struck by a car.  The Decedent’s Counsel argued that he intended to return to his hotel room but was heading in the wrong direction because he was confused. Respondents successfully argued that the Decedent was on a personal deviation from travel status when he went out drinking. Decedent had not returned to the course and scope of employment at the time of his death because he was heading away from his hotel. The ALJ found that the intention to eventually return to a hotel room was not sufficient to end a deviation and specific travel away from the hotel continued the personal deviation. 


Member Karen Gail Treece  successfully defended Claimant’s Appeal in Pickering v. Hercules Commercial, W.C. No. 5-049-650. Claimant alleged he injured his right shoulder while tightening a bolt using an allen/hex wrench. The ALJ denied and dismissed the claim. Claimant complained of pain and was on light duty prior to the alleged date of injury. The ALJ relied upon testimony from Respondents’ expert that it was unlikely a person could exert sufficient force, using a ¼ inch hex wrench, to sustain a significant shoulder injury.  The Claimant appealed. Upon appeal, the Panel found the evidence supported the ALJ’s findings and affirmed.


Jessica Melson AttorneyAssociate Jessica Melson was successful in defeating a full contest claim in Aragon v. Costco Wholesale, Inc. W.C. No. 5-073-284. Claimant alleged she injured her neck by lifting a box of bagels overhead while working in the cooler. Ms. Melson elicited inconsistent testimony from Claimant that she first reported the onset of symptoms occurring over several months before the alleged injury, but testified she heard a pop in her neck on the day of the incident. Respondents’ expert credibly testified that Claimant’s pathology, and need for medical treatment, were related to preexisting degenerative conditions. The onset of symptoms was due to the natural progression of the preexisting conditions. The described mechanism of injury would not cause an injury to the cervical spine. The ALJ denied and dismissed the claim.



The Ongoing Dilemma of Intermittent FMLA Leave

Intermittent FMLA leave is a giant thorn in the side of human resource professionals across the country. The struggle is that not all intermittent leave requests are equal. Here’s a look at some of the most common scenarios and how to handle them. The FMLA allows employers some flexibility in granting different kinds of intermittent leave. Employees are entitled to take it for serious health conditions, either their own or those of immediate family members. The law also allows use of intermittent leave for child care after the birth or placement of an adopted child, but only if the employer agrees to it. It’s the company’s call. It’s not always simple, however; if the mother develops complications from childbirth, or the infant is born premature and suffers from health problems, the “serious health condition” qualifier would likely kick in. As always, it pays to know the medical details before making a decision.   Continue reading this article


Cases You Should Know
Even an ALJ has Limits: In Burren v. ICAO, 2019 COA 37, (March 7, 2019), Claimant sought review of an ALJ’s determination of the date she reached MMI despite there being no finding of MMI by an ATP or DIME physician. Respondents requested a 24-month DIME pursuant to C.R.S § 8-42-107(8)(b)(II), because no treating physician had placed Claimant at MMI in the two years that had elapsed since the date of the work-related injury. The DIME physician opined that Claimant was not at MMI.  Respondents applied for a hearing to overcome the DIME opinion.  The ALJ at the administrative hearing found the Claimant was at MMI.  Upon review, the Panel upheld the ALJ’s Order, concluding that substantial evidence supported the decision.  On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that an ALJ cannot determine MMI when neither a treating physician nor a DIME physician had placed the injured worker at MMI. The Order was set aside and the matter was remanded for the ALJ to enter an order consistent with the Court of Appeals opinion.
Moral of the Story: If neither the ATP nor the DIME physician have found Claimant to be at MMI, an ALJ may not rule a Claimant is.

No Show No TTD: In Willhoit v. ICAO, 2018CA1523 (Feb 14, 2019)(nfsp), Claimant sought review of a Panel decision affirming an ALJ’s Order denying and dismissing his claim for TTD benefits. Claimant sustained an industrial injury that prevented him from performing his essential job functions on July 31, 2017. Claimant stopped working and the employer began paying TTD benefits.   On August 30, 2017, the Employer sent Claimant an offer of modified employment complying with Claimant’s work restrictions.  The offer of modified employment was signed by Claimant’s treating physician.  Claimant failed to show up for work as scheduled. Claimant failed to show up for the following three days.  The employer discontinued Claimant’s TTD benefits pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-42-105(3)(d)(I).  Claimant sought a hearing to reinstate his TTD benefits on the grounds that the modified job offer did not comply with his restrictions. The ALJ denied and dismissed Claimant’s claim for benefits.  On review, the Panel affirmed the ALJ’s opinion.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that when a Claimant is released to modified duty but fails to appear for work, Respondents may unilaterally terminate temporary disability benefits pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-42-105(3)(d)(I).   Neither the statute nor W.C.R.P. 6-1(A)(4) requires that a written offer of modified employment detail every aspect of how a job will be modified.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the Orders of the ALJ and the Panel.

Moral of the story: Respondents may unilaterally terminate TTD benefits when Claimant is released to modified duty but fails to appear for work.


Preexisting Condition is not a Conditional DQ: In Wojciuk v. Public Partnerships Colorado, W.C. No. 5-007-181 (March 4, 2019), Respondents’ sought review of an Order finding Claimant’s knee injury compensable. Claimant was working for the employer as an in-home caregiver.  While lifting a patient, Claimant felt immediate pain in her right knee. Of note, Claimant had preexisting arthritis in her right knee. Claimant initially treated but did not initially report the injury.  At the initial hearing, the ALJ found that Claimant’s pre-existing arthritis became symptomatic while she was doing a heavy lift and was a direct result of her job duties.  The ALJ determined that there was a compensable aggravation of her knee condition.  The Panel upheld the ALJ’s Order as the findings were supported by substantial evidence.


Moral of Story:  A preexisting condition does not disqualify a Claimant from receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

The Ongoing Dilemma of Intermittent FMLA Leave

Intermittent FMLA leave is a giant thorn in the side of humanFMLA Leave resource professionals across the country. The struggle is that not all intermittent leave requests are equal. Here’s a look at some of the most common scenarios, and how to handle them. The FMLA allows employers some flexibility in granting different kinds of intermittent leave. Employees are entitled to take it for serious health conditions, either their own or those of immediate family members. The law also allows use of intermittent leave for child care after the birth or placement of an adopted child, but only if the employer agrees to it. It’s the company’s call. It’s not always simple, however. If the mother develops complications from childbirth, or the infant is born premature and suffers from health problems, the “serious health condition” qualifier would likely kick in. As always, it pays to know the medical details before making a decision.


Eligibility Is Not Automatic

Companies can successfully dispute employee claims to FMLA eligibility. Consider this real-life example: 

A female employee in Maine said she suffered from a chronic condition that made it difficult to make it to work on time. After she racked up a number of late arrivals – and refused an offer to work on another shift – she was fired. She sued, saying her tardiness should have been considered intermittent leave. Her medical condition caused her lateness, she claimed, so each instance should have counted as a block of FMLA leave. Problem was, she’d never been out of work for medical treatment, or on account of a flare-up of her condition. The only time it affected her was when it was time to go to work. 

The Court denied her claim for FMLA eligibility and indicated that intermittent leave is granted when an employee needs to miss work for a specific period of time, such as a doctor’s appointment or when a condition suddenly becomes incapacitating.  That wasn’t the case here, the judge said – and giving the employee FMLA protection would simply have given the woman a blanket excuse to break company rules.

Cite: Brown v. Eastern Maine Medical Center.


Designating Leave Retroactively

In order to maximize workers’ using up their allotted FMLA leave, employers can sometimes classify an absence retroactively. For example, an employee’s out on two weeks of vacation, but she spends the second week in a hospital recovering from pneumonia. Her employer doesn’t learn of the hospital stay until she returns to work. But she tells her supervisor about it, who then informs HR. Within two days, HR contacts the woman and says, “That week you were in the hospital should be covered by the FMLA. Here’s the paperwork.” The key here is that the company acted quickly – within two days of being notified of the qualifying leave. The tactic’s perfectly legal, and it could make a difference in the impact FMLA leave time could have on the firm’s overall operation. It’s also an excellent example of the key role managers play in helping companies deal with the negative effects of FMLA.


Using Employees’ Paid Time Off

Employers should never tell workers they can’t take FMLA leave until they’ve used up all their vacation, sick and other paid time off (PTO). Instead, companies can require employees to use their accrued PTO concurrently with their intermittent leave time. Employers can also count workers’ comp or short-term disability leave as part of their FMLA time – but in that case, employees can’t be asked to use their accrued PTO.


The Transfer Position

Companies can temporarily transfer an employee on intermittent leave, to minimize the effect of that person’s absence on the overall operation. The temporary position doesn’t need to be equivalent to the original job – but the pay and benefits must remain the same. And, of course, the employee must be given his old job – or its equivalent – when the intermittent leave period’s over.

There is one large restriction – the move can’t be made if the transfer “adversely affects” the individual. An example would be if if the new position would lengthen or increase the cost of the employee’s commute.  This would adversely affect the employee. Instead, such transfers need to be handled in such a way as to avoid looking like the employer is trying to discourage the employee from taking intermittent leave – or worse yet, is being punished for having done so.



Although FMLA is certainly an employee-friendly statute, employers do have some rights when it comes to scheduling intermittent leave. For instance, employees are required to consult with their employers about setting up medical treatments on a schedule that minimizes impact on operations. Of course, the arrangement has to be approved by the healthcare provider. But if an employee fails to consult with HR before scheduling treatment, the law allows employers to require the worker to go back to the provider and discuss alternate arrangements.


The Firing Question

Yes, companies can fire an employee who’s on intermittent FMLA leave. Despite the fears of many employers, FMLA doesn’t confer some kind of special dispensation for workers who exercise their leave rights. Obviously, workers can’t be fired for taking leave. But employers can layoff, discipline and terminate those employees who violate company policies or perform poorly. When an employee on FMLA leave is terminated, the Department of Labor decrees that the burdens on the employer to prove the worker would have been laid off, disciplined or terminated regardless of the leave request or usage.


Reductions in Force

When an employer has a valid reason for reducing its workforce, the company can lay off an employee on FMLA leave – as long as the firm can prove the person would have been let go regardless of the leave. However, again companies should be prepared not only to prove the business necessity of the move, but to show an objective, nondiscriminatory plan for choosing which employees would be laid off.


Misconduct or Poor Performance

Employees on FMLA leave – of any type – are just as responsible for following performance and behavior rules as those not on leave. However, companies that fire an employee out on FMLA will be under increased pressure to prove that the decision was based on factors other than the worker’s absence. As such, courts might well pose employers a key question: Why didn’t you fire this person before he/she took leave? This is not an easy answer to explain before a jury if liability is threatened at trial.  The good news is that a number of courts have upheld employers’ rights to fire employees on FMLA leave, even when the employee’s problems were first discovered when the employee went off the job. Nevertheless, companies should move cautiously if they are to terminate an employee currently out on leave due to misconduct or poor performance existing prior to the leave, but discovered after the leave begins.


Every case is different and requires different strategies and decisions because of the intricacies of the FMLA.  Hence, we highly recommend consulting in-house counsel, or one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, to assist in making the appropriate decisions.

New Rule 11 – How’s It Going?

We’re now going on almost three months since the new Rule 11 took effect with the updated DIME fees and procedures.  Time flies, doesn’t it?   There has been some litigation that has ensued as a result of the recent changes, but overall the changes have been well received.  This is likely because most people prepared adequately for the changes that were taking effect well before the start of the New Year.


The litigation that has ensued has been primarily regarding the “regions” listed in the checklist contained on the Application for DIME and the body parts involved in the claim.   Since the “regions” have caused some confusion, the fees have also needed clarification.   Some of the litigation revolved around the specific body parts to a claim and Rule 11’s breakdown of cost.   The checklist looks as follows:


2019 DIME Application


Above each set of body parts, the boxes are listed as regions.  Pursuant to Rule 11, “less than three regions” is a fee of $1,000.   “Three or more regions” is a fee of $1,400.   It is recommended to double-check the Applications for DIME that are received to see if compliance with the Rule is met.   Any discrepancies and/or arguments concerning interpretation of the Rule can be handled by the Prehearing Administrative Law Judges.   The Judges have done an outstanding job of interpreting the Rule and correcting many issues for the DIME unit.  Also note, that some of the disputes have resulted in body parts that either were or were not related to the claim.   Such disputes have involved related body parts that should be part of the DIME, however claimants have tried to keep them out to lower the overall costs of the DIME.   Other disputes have arisen between the terms “and/or” as used in the Rule.  The arguments pertaining to the semantics have been resolved mostly using the word “or” to imply that either one or the other conditions must be met to trigger a particular fee.



In general, the DIME process seems to be running smoothly and interpretation of the new Rules seems to be pretty straightforward.   Like any Rule change, it will take some time to get used to and iron out the wrinkles.  It is important to double-check the new Rule and make sure compliance is met to avoid missing any particular arguments that will pose any sort of leverage in a claim.   Recall, that the new Rule only applies to Notices and Proposals filed on or after January 1, 2019.   Any Notice and Proposal filed before that date adheres to the old Rule 11.


If you have any questions regarding the changes to the Rules or the updated statutes, feel free to contact any of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.


Helmet to Helmet

It’s hard to believe that the 2018 NFL football season is coming to an end soon with Super Bowl LIII. And for the 16th time in 18 years a quarterback named Brady, Manning, or Roethlisberger will represent the AFC in the Super Bowl. This will be the 9th appearance for Patriot’s Quarterback Tom Brady while the Ram’s Quarterback Jared Goff makes his first appearance. The old vs. the new.

While we are indulging in hot wings, pizza, and libations at various Super Bowl parties, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that injuries to professional athletes fall under workers’ compensation insurance. Since these players are performing their job duties and, unlike amateur athletes, they are employees.

Professional football requires two types of insurance: general liability and workers’ compensation since it is mandatory under state laws. Given the lucrative contracts these athletes sign, the Collective Bargaining Agreements often require wage continuation agreements so that these athletes continue to make the same salary if they are injured and off work. Can you imagine an athlete who makes $30 million a year being capped at the state workers’ compensation rate while recovering from an injury? Hence why wage continuation agreements are standard across the league.

With that said, one of the biggest threats to the NFL is the evaporating insurance market. According to multiple sources from the NFL, there is only one carrier willing to provide workers’ compensation coverage for NFL teams because of all the concussion litigation that began in 2011. At that time, at least a dozen carriers occupied the insurance market for pro football. Now, there is one.  Dr. Julian Bales, Medical Director and member of the NFL’s head, neck, and spine committee told ESPN “insurance coverage is arguably the biggest threat to the sport.”[1]

A study done by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s sports concussion program found approximately 300,000 football-related concussions occur each year in youth, high school, college, and professional. And the biggest injury or disease that is making headlines in the NFL is traumatic brain injuries and chronic traumatic encephalopathy or “C.T.E.” The problem with this disease is the unknown “trigger” on how and when the disease starts. The disease is diagnosed after death and the symptoms of depression and delusional behavior may lay dormant for years, or even decades, before they surface. It’s concerning for carriers to know they could be on the hook years down the road given the unknown.

Similar to asbestos claims in workers’ compensation, a carrier can be at risk for a claimant who works one day and is subsequently diagnosed with lung cancer, players in California could file claims, even if they played only one game, to allege their brain disorders were caused by the sport. This cost carriers and the leagues hundreds of millions of dollars which fortunately was curtailed by new legislation in 2013. Still, carriers are cautious to cover the NFL without an exclusion for head trauma.

For many years carriers insured the NFL without restrictions for traumatic brain injuries. Now many of these companies are in a six-year lawsuit with the NFL over who will pay legal fees and claims associated with the 2013 settlement of the $1 billion-dollar class action lawsuit. Hence, these carriers are at higher risk to insure the NFL.

California has one of the most liberal workers’ compensation laws in the Union. Recently, former players who decades ago reached injury settlements with NFL teams and carriers have filed new claims alleging their settlements did not cover traumatic brain injuries. In 2015, a workers’ compensation court found that a former player’s 1989 settlement for cumulative industrial injury “does not extend to the then-unknown cumulative injury to the brain.” Similar to a worker who claims their shoulder pain is due to years of lifting heavy equipment, a former football player can argue their continued migraine headaches are a result of them playing professional football. Chances are several brain disorders like dementia, Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s could be blamed on football. Doctors may ask, “how long did you play football and how many head injuries did you have?” and cite that as the cause for a claimant’s brain disorder when a claim against the NFL is filed. Fortunately, claimants must still meet their burden and prove that pro football alone, and not youth or college football, was the “cause” of their injury or diseases.

Workers’ compensation attorneys in California are handling numerous settled cases in which former NFL players have filed new claims for head trauma. The new claims will only increase costs for litigation and further deter carriers on what they will and will not cover. Fortunately, monetary costs for workers’ compensation claims are capped which will help put a cork in the damn but if the floodgate of old settled claims are allowed to be reopened, the market for coverage will continue to be washed away down the river…

As always, if you have any questions regarding workers’ compensation insurance and laws, please contact one of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.



Rules Are Meant to be Broken – or At Least Updated. 2019 Rule Updates

2019 brings changes to two Rules that affect Colorado Workers’ Compensation. Rule 11 and Rule 16 have both been revised and the changes go into effect January 1, 2019. The changes to Rule 11and the DIME process are extensive. Below is a brief summary of the changes.


Rule 16 is undergoing a few changes.  The rule has been reordered.  Most of the changes are not substantive.  It is strongly recommended that the new rule be referenced in dealing with any prior authorization or billing issue for specifics.  The more substantive changes are highlighted below; however, the specifics of the rule should be reviewed in each situation.

  • ‘Payer’ definition is the same, but the definition now states that use of third parties to pay bills does not relieve the carrier or self-insured employer of obligations under the rules.
  • Recognized healthcare providers previously under 16-5 is now under 16-3.
  • Required use of the medical treatment guidelines, previously under 16-3 is now under 16-4
  • Notification requirements previously under 16-9 is now under 16-5.
  • Prior authorization previously under 16-10 is now under 16-6
  • Contest of prior authorization previously under 16-11 is now under 16-7.

* In conjunction with 16-11 in the new rule governing payment of medical benefits, contest for payment of prior authorization for non-medical reasons now contains examples of non-medical reasons including: no claim has been filed, compensability is not been established, the provider is not authorized, insurance coverage is at issue, typographic, gender or date errors on the bill, failure to submit medical documentation and unrecognized CPT codes.

  • Required use of the medical fee schedule previously under 16-4 is now under 16-8 and specifically sets forth the payment for build services without an established value under the medical fee schedule require prior authorization.
  • Required billing forms and accompanying documentation previously under 16-7 is now under 16-9 and has been added to somewhat.
  • Required medical documentation previously under 16-8 is now under 16-10 and sets forth in greater detail specifically what Form 164 should look like from the doctor’s office.
  • Payment of medical benefits previously under 16-12 is now under16-11.
  • Dispute resolution process previously under 16-13 is now under 16-12.
  • On-site review of hospital or other medical charges previously under 16-14 is folded into 16-10 regarding required medical record documentation.


Rule 11 changes are more substantial. Of Counsel, Brad Hansen, wrote an article about the updates last month and you can read it as well: Because It Goes to 11 – Rule 11 changes for 2019. 


The following is a brief summary of the Rule 11 changes:


  • No real change for years.
  • Doctors’ reluctance to continue to do DIMEs due to reimbursement and increased complexity.


Effective Date

  • January 1, 2019
  • DOWC says there is some leeway for the first month.


Overview of changes

  • Cost
  • Forms
  • Time-frames
  • Logistics



  • 3 tiers based on DOI, and number of body parts
  • $1,000 = DOI < 2 years and < 3 regions marked on the application
  • $1,400 = DOI > 2 years but < 5 years and 3 – 4 body regions marked
  • $2,000 = DOI > 5 years and ≥ 5 or more body regions marked



  • FAL – includes objection to the FAL, notice proposal and application for DIME
  • Request for Appointment to the DIME
  • Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME
  • DIME Examiner Summary Sheet
  • Notice of DIME Negotiations
  • Follow-up DIME
  • DIME Physician Summary Disclosure Form
  • Notice of Reschedule or Termination of DIME
  • Notice of Agreement to Limit the Scope of the DIME
  • DIME Report Template


Time-frames – font color corresponds to responsible party. Key to color below list.

  • FAL = 30 Days After Receipt of MMI (calendar 30 days after report for safety)
  • Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME = 30 Days After Filing of FAL
  • Claimant Files for Indigency = 15 Days After Filing the Notice and Proposal and Application for DIME
  • Attempt to Negotiate DIME = 30 Days After Notice and Proposal and Application (Notice of Negotiation Form to be filed within 30 Days)
  • DOWC Issues Panel = 5 days
  • Summary Disclosure Request = 5 Business Days
  • Requesting Party Strike If No Disclosure Request = 5 Business Days
  • Non-Requesting Party Strike = 5 Business Days
  • DOWC Send DIME Confirmation = 5 Business Days
  • Pay For and Schedule DIME = 14 Days
  • Schedule DIME = Between 35 – 75 Days After DIME Confirmation
  • Complete Copy of Medical Records to Claimant = 14 Days from DIME Confirmation
  • Claimant submits additional Medical Records to Carrier = 10 Days After Medical Packet From Carrier
  • Completed Packet Provided to DIME = 14 Days Before Exam
  • Claimant Notifies Carrier of Need for Interpreter = 14 Days Before Examination
    • Carrier is Responsible for Paying for the Interpreter
  • After DIME = 20 Days After Examination a Report is Generated

Key = Respondent duty       = Claimant duty     = Either Party’s duty



  • New Rule applies to any Notice and Proposal with a certificate of service after 1/1/19
  • Applies to any follow-up DIME after 1/1/19
  • Applies to 24-month DIMEs



  • Body Parts?
    • The checklist proports to control body parts considered
    • PALJs likely to address
    • DIMEs still not confined to specific body parts
  • DIME Cancellation
    • Very tight cancellation time-frames with fixed penalties


The above summaries of Rule 11 and 16 are not intended to be used as legal advice. They are an outline of the changes to those Rules effective January 1, 2019. Please contact an attorney at Lee & Brown for case specific legal recommendations.


It is hard to believe that the holiday season is here and, with that, 2019 will soon be upon us. 2019 Rule 11 revisionsWith the New Year, several changes and updates to the Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure will take place. One rule that will have significant changes and impact on the system is Rule 11, which pertains to the DIME process.

The DIME program has seen little change since its inception in 1991, yet it is an essential piece of the Colorado Workers’ Compensation system. There have been attempts throughout the years to change the procedures from both respondent’s and claimant’s bars but to no avail. After three years of collaboration and tedious consideration, the Division of Workers’ Compensation has finally adopted a new rule that will address key challenges of each stakeholder. This is due in part to weekly staff meetings with representatives from both sides of the bar commenting on the changes and individual meetings with each side of the bar. There were over 50 revisions to Rule 11 and a Public Rule Hearing held for additional comment.


Effective January 1, 2019, these revisions and changes to Rule 11 will take place. Several key changes to the Rule:


    • There will now be a three-tiered payment system based on the date of injury to the filing of the DIME application and the number of body regions indicated on the DIME application;
    • The DIME physician must receive the fee prior to the requesting party scheduling the DIME appointment;
    • The Notice and Proposal and DIME Application are now combined as one document;
    • The time-frame to schedule a DIME appointment is extended to no earlier than 45 days or later than 75 days after the requesting party receives the notice of the DIME Physician Confirmation; and
    • Parties will now be responsible for agreeing on a singular medical records packet to send to the DIME physician.



The Division Rule will go into place January 1st, but the Division has indicated there will be some leniency the first month to sort out compliance issues. By February the Division will be enforcing the new process. Any Notice and Proposal with a certificate of mailing dated on or after January 1, 2019 is subject to the new Rule 11 provisions.


One provision of the Rule that will be advantageous for respondents is the requirement that once a Notice and Proposal is filed, claimant must simultaneously file a DIME application. With the current Rule 11 provision, claimant could file a Notice and Proposal to perfect their jurisdictional requirement to object to the Final Admission of Liability but could wait on filing for a DIME. Sometimes it would be months, or even close to a year, before a DIME application was filed and physician selected. Hopefully, the new Rule 11 revisions will bring a speedier DIME process and claim resolution/closure.


One negative effect of the new Rule is that parties are now to agree on one set of medical records to be sent to the DIME physician. This could create more litigation as claimants may not want to provide certain records, but respondents may feel they should be included in the medical packet. A standoff could require pre-hearings to adjudicate the matter. This is likely why the Division extended the time requirement to 45 – 75 days so that parties have time to reach an agreement on the medical records submitted and additional time to set the DIME appointment.


With these changes to Rule 11, there will be a lot of questions that need to be addressed. The attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC are here to answer any questions you may have regarding the new changes to Rule 11 and will be conducting training seminars “on our DIME” early next year to go over all these changes. Below are some helpful links from the Division of Workers’ Compensation which provides general DIME information and new timelines to consider.



The Legal Buzz – Lee & Brown Newsletter and Case Law Update October 2018

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In The News

Members Joshua Brown and John Abraham, along with Office Manager Denise Iannotti, represented Lee & Brown at the National Association of Minority and Women Owned Law Firms’ (NAMWOLF) Annual Conference held in Chicago September 25-29th. A member since 2013, Lee & Brown is proud to be a part of this outstanding organization and assist in its efforts to promote diversity through the creation of legal opportunity for minority and women owned law firms.

The Firm was very recognized throughout the conference thanks to their ability to “clone” Members Brown and Abraham as life-size cardboard cutouts, which were utilized in the implementation of their well-received game of “Finding Josh and John”. Fellow NAMWOLF Member Krishna Reddy, Esq. of Paul Garcia & Associates in San Antonio, Texas was the very happy winner of an Apple Watch as a result of his savvy game playing skills.

Everyone is now preparing for the next NAMWOLF event – the annual Business Meeting, to be held in New Orleans in February 2019.


Noteworthy Cases

Joshua Brown Attorney DenverMember Joshua Brown and Associate Kristi Robarge  successfully defended a full contest claim in Kelson v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., W.C. 5-061-588. Claimant, a flight attendant, was traveling to her hotel on a shuttle bus when the bus stopped suddenly to avoid a collision. Claimant alleged an injury to her left shoulder from bracing against the seat in front of her. However, Claimant did not report the alleged injury until one month later when she had an unrelated stroke and ended up in the hospital. From the date of the alleged injury until Claimant’s unrelated stroke, she continued to work full duty. Respondents’ expert testified that it was not medically probable that the left shoulder injury was causally related to the shuttle bus incident. The ALJ found Respondents’ expert more credible and persuasive than Claimant and denied and dismissed her claim for compensation.


John Abraham Denver AttorneyMember John Abraham and Associate Jessie M. Tasselmyer successfully defended against Claimant’s request for ongoing maintenance medical care in Riccillo v. Parkview Medical Center. Claimant suffered a slip and fall accident in 1996. Claimant underwent extensive treatment and was ultimately placed at MMI. Thereafter, the indemnity portion of her case was settled, except for maintenance medical care. Claimant continued to treat and receive medications. Respondents retained an expert to opine on Claimant’s ongoing maintenance medical care. Respondents’ expert testified at hearing that Claimant suffered from a somatic pain disorder as well as pre-existing depression and anxiety. He further testified that even though Claimant’s ongoing depression and anxiety may have been related to the industrial injury in the past, it was no longer probable that her continued complaints of depression and anxiety were related to the industrial injury approximately 22 years later. The ALJ found Respondents’ expert more credible and persuasive than Claimant and denied and dismissed her claim for compensation.


Of Counsel Sheila Toborg and Associate Jessie M. Tasselmyer successfully defended against Claimant’s attempt to overcome a DIME in Thompson v. The Home Depot. Claimant alleged that the DIME failed to address her psycho-social issues impacting her physical condition. Claimant also alleged that her physical abilities at the time of the DIME were inaccurate due to the performance of a steroid injection prior to the exam. Respondents’ expert credibly testified that the findings of the DIME were appropriate, and that Claimant’s ongoing complaints were unrelated to the work injury. The ALJ relied on testimony of Respondents’ IME physician and the DIME report, stating that the report addressed all of Claimant’s complaints and conditions and that there was no convincing evidence that the DIME’s determination of MMI was invalid.


Of Counsel M. Frances McCracken, successfully defended a full contest claim in Garza v. Walmart Associates. Inc. dba Sam’s Wholesale Club. Claimant alleged he injured his back when he slipped on water at work. Claimant denied falling but stated he “significantly wind-milled his arms in a Charlie Chaplin like manner” to maintain his balance and felt a twinge in his back. Security video did not show Claimant wind-milled or cartwheeled his arms. It showed he walked, slipped, bent slightly forward, and did not spill any liquid from the cup he was carrying. Ms. McCracken elicited credible witness testimony that Claimant stated he worked on a 40-acre ranch and lifted 80-pound hay bales after the incident. Respondents’ expert testified there was no mechanism of injury that would cause Claimant’s complaints. The claim was denied and dismissed.


    Associate Dan Mowrey defended a compensability claim in Nunez v. Custom AG Pak, LLC before the Industrial Commission of Arizona. The Applicant asserted he injured his back and neck at work on December 1, 2017. He testified reporting the injury to “a younger gentleman in human resources”, who told him to rest. The Applicant stated he rested the remainder of his shift and went home. He sought medical treatment the next day in Mexico. He did not return to work for the employer. At the hearing, the Applicant’s brother testified Claimant injured his right shoulder; however, Applicant did not present a medical professional to show a connection between the alleged workplace exposure and injury in advance of the hearing as required by the Rules of Procedure before the Industrial Commission, A.A.C. R20-5-141. Applicant further did not file any medical records or other documentation. Therefore, the ALJ found that Applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claim and ordered it dismissed.



John Abraham Of Counsel

Recovery of Overpayments in Workers’ Compensation Claims

The issue of overpayments has drawn much attention in recent years. Several claims have gone up to the appellate courts regarding the jurisdiction and ability of the Division and an ALJ to order repayment of workers’ compensation benefits that were previously paid. As you may imagine, repayment of several thousand dollars by a claimant is usually very difficult, if not impossible. Employers and carriers usually protect themselves and recoup overpayment from future benefits owed. Several cases have emerged (as well as arguments from claimants) that recovery of overpayments is impermissible, unconstitutional, and burdensome. Continue reading the article.

Cases You Should Know

Death is Guaranteed but WC Benefits are Not: In Becirovic v. ICAO, 17CA1505 (August 16, 2018)(nfsp), Claimant passed away on November 19, 2013, before a hearing could be held on the issue of compensability in her workers’ compensation claim. On March 23, 2015, Dr. Hall sent Claimant’s attorney a letter opining Claimant’s work injury may have contributed to her death. Claimant filed a Dependent’s Notice of Claim on December 9, 2015. Respondents filed a Notice of Contest contending the claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than two years after Claimant’s death pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-43-103(2). The ALJ dismissed the case as barred by the statute of limitations. Claimant appealed and asserted the statute of limitations should not have begun to run until he received Dr. Hall’s report at which time the nature and probable compensable nature of the injury was first recognized, City of Boulder v. Payne, 426 P.2d 194 (1967). However, the ALJ found Claimant had the medical records and information that were sent to Dr. Hall and provided no explanation as to why she waited more than a year after the death to obtain a medical opinion or to timely file a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal.


Moral of the Story: Comply with procedural and jurisdictional requirements because failure to do so may bar claims indefinitely.


ATP Trumps DIME Regarding Medical Treatment: Respondents sought to overcome a DIME finding that Claimant was not at MMI. The ALJ determined Respondents failed to overcome the DIME and ordered them to pay for the EMG and surgical consultation recommended by the DIME physician. Respondents appealed. The Panel found Respondents did not overcome the DIME, but it held the ALJ was without authority to order Respondents to pay for the surgical consultation. An ALJ may order payment for diagnostic testing because it serves an evidentiary purpose to determine MMI and impairment; however, surgical consultations constitute a medical benefit, which must be recommended by an ATP. Potter v. Grounds Service Company and Truck Insurance Exchange, W.C. No. 4-935-523 (August 2018).


Moral of the Story: A DIME is not an authorized provider and an ALJ does not have the authority to direct Respondents to pay for treatment recommended only by the DIME where there is no support from an authorized provider within the chain of referrals.


What a Relief: In Rajabi v. Arvada Fire Protection District, W.C. No. 5-044-870-01 (February 22, 2018), Claimant sought review of the ALJ’s Order denying Claimant’s request for “assistance with general home services and activities, including yard services…” The ALJ ruled that Claimant’s request for home and yard services “would not cure and relieve the symptoms and effects of the Claimant’s industrial injury” and that the “services were not incidental to medical treatment…” to relieve Claimant’s symptoms. The ALJ relied on the opinions of Respondents’ IME physician in rendering her decision. ICAO affirmed the credibility decisions of the ALJ and reasoned that the ALJ credited the testimony of Respondents’ IME physician more than the testimony of Claimant and her expert.


Moral of the Story: Medical treatment, including home health care, must be related to the industrial injury to cure and / or relieve symptoms of the industrial injury.


What a Relief, Part 2: In Rajabi v. Arvada Fire Protection District, W.C. No. 5-044-870-01 (February 22, 2018), Claimant appealed and argued that the ALJ erred in permitting the testimony of Respondents’ IME physician and the IME report due to failure to timely disclose the report. Respondents admitted that Respondents’ IME report was exchanged beyond the 20-day time period prescribed in Rule 9-1. ICAO ruled that the ALJ properly admitted the testimony and report of Respondents’ IME physician. ICAO reasoned that the IME report was properly admitted through the testimony of the IME physician. Furthermore, ICAO reasoned Claimant failed to exercise procedural safeguards prior to hearing. Specifically, Claimant did not request the report prior to hearing, had knowledge of the IME physicians’ testimony through Respondents’ interrogatories, and had an opportunity to cross-examine Respondents’ IME physician. The ALJ’s Order was affirmed.


Moral of the Story: Evidence, including anticipated testimony disclosed 21 or more days after hearing, may be precluded if the opposing party is not provided an opportunity to contest the late disclosure of evidence.


Lost Time, No DIME?: In Gibson v. Atlantic Relocation Services, W.C. NO. 5-020-939-01, ICAO affirmed the ALJ’s denial of Respondents’ request to strike the DIME. ICAO reasoned that the decision in Harman-Bergstedt v. Loofbourrow, 320 P.3d 327 (Colo. 2014), did not preclude the Claimant from pursuing a DIME when he suffered no wage loss or no lost time. ICAO agreed with the determinations of the ALJ that the Claimant suffered a “disability,” which is evidenced by his physical restrictions which impaired his ability to perform his job. In this case, Claimant was assigned work restrictions by the ATP. However, his Employer continued to pay his full wages. ICAO reasoned that a Claimant must obtain a DIME to challenge “the ATP’s MMI determination, the impairment rating, or both…” even if the Employer continues the Claimant’s wages despite work restrictions.


Moral of the Story: Even if a Claimant suffered no wage loss or no lost time, they are still permitted to obtain a DIME.

Recovery of Overpayments in Workers’ Compensation Claims

The issue of overpayments has drawn much attention in recent years.   Several claimsOverpayment in WC Claims have gone up to the appellate courts regarding the jurisdiction and ability of the Division and an ALJ to order repayment of workers’ compensation benefits that were previously paid.  As you may imagine, repayment of several thousand dollars by a claimant is usually very difficult, if not impossible.  Employers and carriers usually protect themselves and recoup overpayment from future benefits owed.  Several cases have emerged, (as well as arguments from claimants), that recovery of over-payments is impermissible, unconstitutional, and burdensome.


The parties must always take into consideration that the workers’ compensation system is a gamble at every stage.   The parties often encounter substantial risk throughout the claim that could tip the scales in favor of one party or the other.  The Division IME is one such process.  Another example is a merits hearing and the ultimate determination of the ALJ.  Claimants risk that benefits paid earlier in the claim will suddenly become an overpayment based on the opinions of either a physician or a Judge, or both.


Pursuant to section 8-40-201(15.5), C.R.S., an overpayment is defined as: “money received by a claimant that exceeds the amount that should have been paid, or which the claimant was not entitled to receive, or which results in duplicate benefits because of offsets that reduce disability or death benefits payable under said articles. For an overpayment to result, it is not necessary that the overpayment exist at the time the claimant received disability or death benefits under said articles.”


Recovery of overpayments is permitted within the Act.  Many examples exist in which a claimant may have been paid money that they were not owed.  Most of the time, Respondents recoup an overpayment from PPD or future indemnity.  However, in a situation in which there are no future benefits owed, the Act allows for garnishment of the claimant’s assets upon filing of a final order with the district court.  Section 8-43-306(1), C.R.S. states, “A certified copy of any final order of the director or an administrative law judge ordering the payment of  any penalty  or  repayment  of  overpayments  pursuant  to  articles 40 to 47 of this title may be filed with the clerk of the district  court  of  any  county  in  this  state  at  any  time  after  the  period  of  time  provided  by  articles  40  to  47  of  this  title  for  appeal  or  seeking  review  of  the  order  has  passed  without  appeal or review being sought or, if appeal or review is sought, after  the  order  has  been  finally  affirmed  and  all  appellate  remedies and all opportunities for review have been exhausted. The party filing the order shall at the same time file a certificate to  the  effect  that the  time  for  appeal  or  review  has  passed without appeal or review being undertaken or that the order has been  finally  affirmed  with  all  appellate  remedies  and  all  opportunities for review having been exhausted. The clerk of the  district  court  shall  record  the  order  and  the  filing  party’s  certificate in the judgment book of said court and entry thereof made in the judgment docket, and it shall thenceforth have all the effect of a judgment of the district court, and execution may issue thereon out of said court as in other cases. Any such order may be filed by and in the name of the director or by and in the name of the party in the worker’s compensation action who was injured by the violation of any provision of articles 40 to 47 of this title  or  who  was  found  to  be  entitled  to  repayment  of  overpayments under said articles.”


It is quite difficult for a claimant attorney to explain to their client that money that was previously received by a claimant, now had to be paid back to the carrier.  For example, when a Division IME physician backdates the date of MMI, and TTD that was paid during the prior MMI period, now becomes an overpayment; a claimant is often left with the burden of understanding how a physician can retroactively find that MMI happened earlier in time.  Another example is recovery of benefits against SSDI that is being collected.  Claimant sometimes believe that they are entitled to SSDI and TTD/TPD concurrently without an offset.


Many arguments have been made to the appellate courts unsuccessfully regarding collection of an overpayment.  One such argument involves “monies due and owed at the time of payment.”  Any money paid to the claimant at the time it was owed should not be an “overpayment” pursuant to the Act.  This argument was addressed by the Court of Appeals and they declined to follow it indicating that the Act allows for repayment of monies in situations in which the money was never due in the first place.  It wouldn’t be surprising for this line of thinking to be quickly eroded by a legislative change in which an overpayment is defied expressly in the statute by other means in which the facts of a case would not change the overall intentions of the way it was written.


For now, Respondents have one-year from the date the overpayment exists or accrued to claim it.  If it is not claimed, it is considered waived.  If an overpayment of indemnity exists on a file, it is best to claim it right away and strategize with counsel how best to recoup the overpayment.  Sometimes, remedies can be worked out with the claimant to make both parties happy and ensure that there is not prejudice to either side.  It can certainly prevent an Order being granted which puts the claimant is a difficult position of having to make a repayment of monies, when in all likelihood the money is either gone and/or has a very little chance of being seen again.


If you have any questions regarding an overpayment, recoupment, or strategy regarding benefits on a claim; please contact any of the attorneys at Lee & Brown, LLC.



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