Legal Connection Firm Newsletter – July 2017
Please follow us on LinkedIn
In the News
Member Joseph Gren attended the WBENC National Conference in Las Vegas last month. The WBENC conference was attended by hundreds of corporations who support diversity initiatives in hiring minority owned, women owned, and veteran owned businesses. Many of Lee + Kinder’s clients were among those corporations. Attending the WBENC conference was a powerful experience, affirming the commitment of so many corporations to support businesses like Lee + Kinder, LLC, and other minority and women owned enterprises.
Member Joseph Gren and Associate Jenna Zerlynick authored an article for the Colorado Lawyer, July 2017 edition. The article, Settlement Procedures in Workers’ Compensation, is an in-depth explanation of the unique procedural requirements governing settlement of Colorado Workers’ Compensation Claims. Click the link in the article name to read the full article.
Proposed Rule 16 and 18 Changes for 2018: Utilization Standards and Medical Fee Schedule
Changes are coming for the Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, Rules 16 and 18. The changes to these very important rules will be implemented January 1, 2018. Rule 16 addresses Utilization Standards such as procedures and time frames for prior authorization. Rule 18 addresses the Medical Fee Schedule. The proposed rule changes are currently available on the Division of Workers’ Compensation website for review. A public hearing is scheduled for August 1, 2017 at 9:30 am at the Division of Workers’ Compensation to address the proposed changes. Lee + Kinder will provide updates regarding these important changes as the process moves forward.
Here are some of the key proposals:
- Rule 16-11(A) – Contest of prior authorization & Rule 16-12 – Contesting payment for non-medical reasons: The medical review, IME report, or report from an ATP that addresses the relatedness of the requested treatment to the admitted claim may precede a prior authorization request.
- Rule 16-11(E) – IMEs for contesting prior authorization: In order to contest prior authorization with an IME, the IME appointment must occur within 30 days or upon first available appointment of the prior authorization request, but not later than 60 days after the request. The IME report must be issued within 20 days of the IME, and the insurer must respond to the prior authorization request within 5 business days of the receipt of the IME report. If the injured worker does not attend or reschedules the IME, the payer may deny prior authorization requests pending completion of the IME.
- Rule 16-9 – Notification submissions: These submissions must still be admitted or denied within 5 business days, but the payer may limit the initial approval to the number of treatments/duration listed in the relevant Medical Treatment Guidelines (MTGs). If subsequent medical records document functional progress, then the payer shall pay for the additional number of treatments/treatment duration listed in the relevant MTGs. If the payer proposes to discontinue treatment before the maximum number of treatments/treatment duration has been reached due to lack of functional progress, payer shall support that decision with a medical review compliant with section 16-11(B).
- The use and definition of telemedicine is expanded.
- The fee schedule reimbursement for out-of-state providers may be negotiated in excess of the fee scheduled when necessary to obtain reasonable and necessary care.
Member Joshua D. Brown and Associate Kristi Robarge successfully defended an appeal to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) in Alan Dillingham v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., W.C. No. 5-014-315-01. Claimant sought review of the ALJ’s Order denying compensability and dismissing Claimant’s request for medical benefits. The ALJ determined that Claimant suffered from a substantial pre-existing condition which caused severe degenerative arthritis that was not exacerbated or accelerated by his work activities. The ALJ also determined that Claimant’s need for a total knee arthroplasty was not related to his work activities. Claimant argued that the ALJ erred in finding that he did not suffer an aggravation of his pre-existing condition or, in the alternative, that he suffered a cumulative trauma injury because of the conflicting evidence supporting Claimant’s position. Respondents argued that the ALJ’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, given Claimant’s long history of a pre-existing condition, and Respondents’ medical expert’s testimony. ICAO affirmed the Order, finding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determinations.
Of Counsel M. Frances McCracken successfully contested a claim that Claimant’s hearing loss was causally related to his work injury and required in-the-canal hearing aids in Martinez v. Walmart Stores, W.C. 5-019-127-01. Claimant did not report any hearing loss until five months post-accident and he initially reported the hearing loss as being chronic. Claimant’s ATP did not have any prior medical records relating to Claimant’s treatment for renal failure or biliary cancer and chemotherapy treatment, both of which are known causes of hearing loss. The ALJ credited Respondents’ medical expert and determined that Claimant’s hearing loss, dizziness, and disequilibrium were not related to the work injury. Claimant’s claim for in-the-canal hearing aids was denied and dismissed along with Claimant’s claim for narcotic pain medications and anti-nausea medications.
Of Counsel M. Frances McCracken was successful in a second win by overcoming the DIME’s opinion that Claimant sustained a 27% whole person impairment and defended against Claimant’s claim for additional medical benefits in Jaramillo v. Family Dollar Stores of Colorado, Inc., W.C. 5-000-936-02. Claimant initially suffered an abdominal strain which questionably transitioned to SI joint pain. When placed at MMI, Claimant had full range of motion of her lumbar spine. However, the DIME provided Claimant with a 5% Table 53 impairment rating and a 23% whole person impairment based on loss of range of motion of the lumbar spine. Respondents’ medical expert credibly opined that it was not medically probable that Claimant suffered a discrete injury to her SI joint without immediate pain in that region. Respondents’ medical expert also credibly testified that the DIME physician clearly erred in assigning Claimant’s impairment rating for loss of lumbar range of motion, given the discrepancies in her measurements. The ALJ concluded that Respondents had overcome the DIME opinion by clear and convincing evidence.
Associate Jessica Melson successfully defended Claimant’s attempt to overcome the DIME and request for home health care in Schaffer v. Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC, W.C. No. 4-946-584. In this case, a DIME found Claimant at MMI with specific disorder impairments to his cervical and lumbar spine. However, the DIME physician excluded range of motion impairment because she determined there was no objective basis for his limited motion. Claimant sought to overcome the DIME. Claimant alleged he was not at MMI because he required psychological evaluation and treatment. He also alleged that the DIME erred in excluding the range of motion measurements because it was not within the DIME physician’s discretion to exclude valid range of motion measurements. Claimant also sought home health care as recommended by the ATP. The ALJ credited the testimony of Respondents’ medical expert that it was within the DIME physician’s discretion to not utilize the range of motion measurements if she did not find that it was Claimant’s true functional range of motion. The ALJ found that Claimant failed to overcome the DIME regarding MMI and impairment. The ALJ also found that Claimant failed to demonstrate the request for home health care was related to the claim, as he was already receiving home health care before the request and Respondents’ medical expert testified it was not reasonable, necessary, and/or related.
A FIRST! FDA REQUESTS WITHDRAWAL OF OPANA® ER FROM THE MARKET;
Amid the nation’s ongoing and “unprecedented opioid epidemic” (per the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), on June 8, 2017, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration requested Endo Pharmaceuticals to voluntarily remove its opioid pain medication, reformulated Opana ER (oxymorphone hydrochloride), from the market. The request was based on concerns that the benefits of the drug no longer outweigh its risks related to abuse. This is the first time the FDA has taken steps to remove a currently marketed opioid pain medication due to the public health consequence of abuse.
Click here to continue reading this article.
Cases You Should Know
How we can be sure this settlement is full AND final?: A recent Colorado Supreme Court ruling provided a significant opinion regarding workers’ compensation settlement agreements. In Victor England v. Amerigas Propane, 395 P.3d 766 (Colo. 2017), the Court found that Claimant’s undiagnosed scapular fracture, at the time he entered into a settlement agreement, constituted a mutual mistake of material fact and allowed Claimant to reopen his claim despite the settlement. Specifically, the issue addressed whether those documents waive an injured worker’s statutorily protected right to reopen a settlement based on mutual mistake of material fact. Respondents were successful on appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which found that the settlement agreements’ waiver provision prohibited reopening of the settlement agreement on grounds of mutual mistake after the injured worker discovered he had an unknown scapula fracture. The injured worker petitioned to have the Colorado Supreme Court review the decision.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued their Order on May 30, 2017. In their decision, the Supreme Court concluded that specifically paragraph six of the settlement agreement form cannot waive or limit an employee’s statutory right to reopen the claim on the grounds of mutual mistake of material fact. The Supreme Court stated that they interpreted paragraph six to be consistent with the settlement statutory provision, C.R.S.§8-43-204(1), and concluded that paragraph six applies only to those “unknown injuries” which develop after a settlement agreement is approved. They concluded that in this case, there was a mutual mistake of material fact and that therefore under paragraph four of the settlement agreement, the injured worker has the right to reopen the claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with their opinion.
Moral of the story: This impact of this case on the DOWC form settlement documents and settlements overall is still uncertain. In light of this decision, our Firm has added further language in settlement documents to paragraph 9(a), which allows addendums, to attempt to limit Respondents’ exposure from a claim being reopened under facts similar to the England case. At this time, the language we have implemented to the settlement documents is being accepted and approved, but this issue will likely undergo further scrutiny by the DOWC.
Workers unite! But beware of the Mutual Benefit Doctrine: In Pueblo County v. ICAO, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that union activity cases in Colorado should be analyzed under the Mutual Benefit Doctrine to determine compensability. (May 18, 2017, Colo. Ct. App.). Claimant was injured as a result of a slip and fall following a union meeting after work. The slip and fall occurred in the employer’s parking lot. The Court of Appeals concluded that the union meeting was to facilitate ongoing negotiations concerning a new collective bargaining agreement, which was of mutual benefit to the employer and employee. As such, the Court opined that the Mutual Benefit Doctrine applied. The Mutual Benefit Doctrine states that an injury suffered by an employee while performing a function that is of mutual benefit to the employer and the employee is usually compensable when some advantage to the employer results from the employee’s conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling and found the claim compensable.
Moral of the Story: Injuries occurring while the employee is engaged in union activities in Colorado will be analyzed under the Mutual Benefit Doctrine to determine compensability. If there is a mutual benefit to employee and employer, the claim will likely be deemed compensable.
A spoonful of medical evidence helps apportionment go down: In Richard Hutchison v. ICAO, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the ALJ and ICAO’s Orders which determined that only one-third of Claimant’s injury was work related. (June 1, 2017, Colo. Ct. App.) Claimant was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his bilateral knees. At the initial hearing, there were conflicting medical opinions as to whether the arthritis was caused by Claimant’s employment, but the ALJ found that Claimant’s bilateral knee pain was not directly and proximately caused by Claimant’s work. The ALJ adopted the apportionment recommendations of Respondents’ medical expert and attributed one-third of the cause of Claimant’s bilateral arthritis to work-related factors. The ICAO concluded that the ALJ’s Order properly apportioned the injury and was supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals found that both physicians opined that Claimant had an underlying condition prior to the work injury. Furthermore, the Court held that the opinions of Respondents’ medical expert were concrete and not speculative. As such, the Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s apportionment findings and held the Panel did not err when it declined to set aside the Order.
Moral of the story: An ALJ’s opinions are not disturbed if supported by medical evidence. In this case, the ALJ’s ruling on apportionment was upheld because it was supported by the medical evidence and expert testimony.
Credibility is in the eye of the beholder – abuse of discretion v. substantial evidence: In Work v. CBC Companies, Inc., W.C. No. 5-002-879-01 (May 15, 2017), Respondents sought review of the ALJ’s Order that determined Claimant’s cervical spine condition was causally related to the industrial incident and held Respondents liable for the costs of the recommended cervical spine surgery. Respondents argued that the ALJ erred in discrediting a medical expert because the expert was unwilling to characterize the recommendations for speculative surgery as medical malpractice. Respondents also argued that the ALJ erred in discrediting another medical expert for using the term “deny” in his report. Respondents contended that the ALJ’s credibility determinations were an abuse of discretion and were not supported by the record. ICAO explained that an appellate review of an ALJ’s credibility determinations was based upon a substantial evidence standard and not an abuse of discretion standard. ICAO noted that an ALJ is not required to articulate the basis for his credibility determinations but in this case he did so. ICAO also noted that it is “bound by the ALJs credibility determinations except in extreme circumstances where the evidence credited is so overwhelmingly rebutted by hard, certain evidence that it would be error as a matter of law to believe such testimony.” ICAO was mindful of Respondents’ complaints but found that the credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ’s Order was affirmed.
Moral of the Story: An ALJ’s credibility determination will be upheld as long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support a determination.